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Statement of Problem
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ideas of Robert H.
Jackson' s opening and c l osing speech es at the Nurnberg trial in t erms
of the inventive process .

These speeches present the speaker ' s ideas

and were ch osen by t he wri ter as the most appropriate sel ections
embodying Jackson ' s ideas.

Sources of Data
Research has been gathered from the following kinds of sources :
Jackson' s Opening and Cl osing Addresses ; cross- examinations of the
defendants ; reports to the President; various accounts of the trial by
the defendants , j usti ces , and other observers; and magazine articles
published during the trial months.

Major Findings
J ackson , the speaker , is deal t with in the second chapter
Th i s information i ncl udes his

providi ng biographical material.
1

2

upbringing and his education.

The development of his career as a

lawyer is discussed.
An

account of the social setting at Nurnberg and the trial's

audience are also included in the second chapter.

These accounts

help to stage the trial and describe the atmosphere in which
Jackson presents his speeches.
The third chapter provides an outline of the methodology used
in the study.

It establishes the criteria and describes the procedure

that is followed.
Next , the speeches are analyzed in the fourth chapter.

A

description of how Jackson's philosophy was applied is provided.
The Opening and Closing Addresses are discussed and their effect
upon the Tribunal, the trial outcane, and history is cited.
A brief description of each defendant, his association with the
Nazi party, and charges of indictment are also given.

Along with the

description of the defendants, the four counts of indictment upon
which the defendants were charged is mentioned in the fourth chapter.

Conclusions
The last chapter summarizes the information given in the thesis
and analyzes the significance of the speeches and their impact on the
trial and on history.
The chapter also gives an account of the sentences given to each
of the defendants is also provided.
An

appendix and bibliography accompany the thesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

I . Introduction

Long before Justice Robert H. Jackson became a part of the
Nurnberg trial , the Departments of War, State , and Justice had been
pondering the idea of bringing t h e top Naz i l eaders and organizations to trial as criminals.

When discuss i ons b egan for an inter-

national trial of Nazi war criminals, Fra nklin Delano Roosevelt was
the President of the United States .

A conference h a d been held a t

Ya l ta , a city in the Soviet Union, to discuss in general terms such
a trial.

This conference was attended by President Roosevelt,

Winston Churchill, a nd Joseph Stalin in 1945 .

President Roosevelt

died later that year at a time when Judge Samuel I . Rosenman was
abroad obtaining an agreement among the nations on a plan of trial.
Judge Rosenman ' s duties ended after a presentation in San Francisco
to t h e Soviet , French , and British Foreign Ministers .

It was at this

point that Justice Robert H. Jackson assumed the task of negotiating
among these nations .
The first public announcement of the upcoming trial, and the
United States ' involvement , came in a report released by
President Harry Truman o n June 7, 1945 .

President Truman ' s approval

of the program was widely published in Europe and served as a point
of reference from which following proposal s were studied.

1

2

On August 8 , 1 945, the Ag r eement of London was signed by the
United Kingdom , the Soviet Union, France , and the United States .
The agree ment sanctioned an I nternational Mil i tary Tribunal.

It was

from t h is agreement a nd the contents thereof that J u stice Jackson
took t h e theme of his Opening Speech.

The theme and content s o f

Jackson' s Closing Speech were taken from the evidence presented
during the trial.

Justice J ackson wrote , " The Opening Statement

and the Clos ing Speec h for the United State s , one anticipating , t he
other reviewing the evidence , state the substance of the c onspiracy
case against the individual defe ndants .

111

It was a respect for the skill and l ead e rship of Justice
Jackson , the sign ificance of his opening and c l o sing remarks, a n d
the impact of the trial itself on a troubled world that provided the
motivation for the writer to undertak e this study .

I I . Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this s tudy is to e xamine the ideas of
Robert Jackson ' s op e ning and closing speeches in terms of t he
inventive process .

Invention involves the attempt on the part o f

the orator , Cicero says , as reflected b y Thonssen and
Baird , " to find out what he should say . ... "

It i s an

1

Robert H. J ack son , The Nilrnberg Case (New York: Cooper Square
Publishers , Inc ., 1 9 71 ), p. i x.
2

Lest er Thonssen and A. Craig Baird , Spe ech Criticism (Ne w
York : The Ronald Press Co ., 1948), p.79 .

3

investigative undertaking, embracing a survey and forecast of the
subject and a search for the arguments suitabl e to the given rhetori cal effect.

Thus certain writers -Aristotle among them- give more

attention to invention than to other parts of rhetoric .

This is

done on the ground that the content is the most important part of
the speech .

3

Jackson ' s opening and closing speeches present the

speaker ' s ideas .

These two speeches have , therefore , been selected

by the writer as the most appropriate selections embodying Jackson ' s
ideas .
The range of this study has been limited to an analysis of the
speaker's ideas and the action arising from those ideas .

The

answers to two questions should be discussed in an analysis of the
speeches in addition to certain conclusions about Jackson's ideas :
first , the effect of the speeches on the outcome of the trial; and
second , the influence of J a ckson ' s ide as upon international law and
concepts of general warfare.
In deciding upon this plan , the writer felt that the speaker ' s
addresses are more than bombast .

The purpose of public

addresses is not merely to make possible an opportunity for speakers
to exercise their rhetorical skills, but to make valuable
contributions to the affairs of man.
3

Ibid .

(Not on l y do speakers make

4

valuable contributions , but the criti cs as well by analyzing the
speaker ' s works . ) As Ernest J . Wrage states , "Th ey (students of
public address ) possess credentials worthy of acknowledgment and
interest in a type of materials germane to the object . 11 4

Albert

J . Croft also expressed the same bel ief in that " criticism s hould
go beyond concern with purely formal rhetorical conceptions ; it
must enter the fie l d of making specific value judgments of the
appropriateness and rightness of the idea adaptation to be found in
speeches. "

5

Cr oft a l so suggests of the speech criti c that one

objective is the historical function of rhetoric .

With this

objective Croft would have the critic "report and interpret the
manner in which a speaker ' s values have b een related ~o the social
values of his audiences in the course of his rhetorical adaptation . 11 6
The function of thiswriter is that of both anal yst and critic.

In

order to criticize a speech one must be able to first analyze the
speech and evaluate the credibility and effectiveness of the speech .
The focus of this study is upon the viewpoints of the speaker
concerning his concepts of man , his ideas, a nd the society in which
he lives .

An a nalysis of rhetoric includes a great deal more than

most persons realize .

The subjects of history , philsophy , and public

4 Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, Methods of Rhetorical
Criticism (New York : Harper & Row , Publishe rs , 1972), p . 1 05 .
5

Albert J . Croft , "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism, "
Quartely Journal of Speech, Vol. LXII (Oct. , 1956), p.291 .
6

Ibid ., p.287 .

5

speaking are interrelated and to analyze speeches all of these must
be considered .

A critic must not onl y study the speaker ' s ideas , but

the influence of the ideas c ontained in public speeches upon history.
The circumstances of the Nlirnberg trial are appropriate for an
idea centered study .

The trial revolves around the ideas of men and

nations and the organization of those ideas and the laws of nations
to serve as the framework of the trial.

It was Justice Jackson who

organized the trial and who worked closely with the other nations '
leaders to mold these different and varied ideas and laws into a
viable format for the trial .
Justice Jackson expressed these ideas in his opening and
closing speeches .

It was the ideas and beliefs of individual

nations cooperating with each other in creating an international
military tribunal and the construction of a trial of tnis nature that
made a study of ideas pragmatic and operational .

III. Definition of Terms

The legal terms used in Jackson ' s speeches need defining .

It

is the decision of the writer that it is best to present these terms
in a glossary in the appendix to this work.

This procedure will be

a more convenient reference for the reader of the two speeches .
certain words and names of cities and people involved will be
referred to by the German names.

The glossary will include the

translation of these words and names.

Also

6

IV. Statement of Organization

This study contains five chapters with the addi tion of a
bibliography and glossary.
Chapter II deals with Jackson , the speaker and the atmosphere
in which he delivered the two speeches .
material on Jackson.

It includes biographical

This chapter also brings to the surface a

synopsis of Jackson ' s background and deve l opment of the ideas that
surround his speeches.

Certain other biographical material is

discussed for the purpose of understanding the speeches.

A critic

cannot sufficiently examine the speeches of any speaker without
including a biographical study also .

The writings of all speakers

reveal certain facts concerning the ir background.

I t is important

for the critic to understand the speaker ' s background in order to
understand the speaker ' s work .
An

account of the social setting at Nlirnberg and the trials '

audience are also included in Chapter II.

These accounts will help

to stage the trial and describe the atmosphere in which Jackson had
to present his speeches.
Chapter III outlines the methodology used in this study .

It is

a descripti on of criteria and procedure.
The speeches are anal yze d i n Chapter I V.

Along with a brief

sketch of the defendents and the counts of t he indic tments .

This

chapter accomplishes the purpose of this work; i.e . the study of the
ideas and their impli cations in Jackson ' s speeches.
Chapter V compri ses a summary and conclusion.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND THE SETTING
I. The Background of the Speaker
"Throughout his career as a lawyer {in both private
and public practice) and as a judge , Jackson maintained
close ties with the organized bar. He identified strongly
and positively with his p r ofessi on , and many of his
opinions - as well as his extramural writing - refl ect his
d eep i nterest of the interests of l awyers . His continuing
preoccupation with the practice of l aw made him an
a u thentic spokesman for the l egal profession ... More than
any other Supreme Court justice in this century , Robert
Jackson was the voice of the bar , speaking from the
bench. 11 1
Jackson's main concern was the failure of his colleagues to
live up to the high s tandards of j udic i al neutral ity.

Although he

felt that justice should be "dispassionate," he was very "human "
and "not unpassionate. 112

Since the mid-fifties many of the beli efs

held by Jackson have changed, but the two problems that concerned
him most still remain; " the social and economical issues that confront the political decision makers of today."

3

These same social

and economic problems were a great part of the Niirnberg trial.
Jackson valued both individual freedom and social s t ability.
He fel t that public policy-making was the responsibi lity of the
1 Glendon Schubert , Dispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the
Judicial Opinions of Robert H. Jackson {New York: The Bobbs - Merrill
Company , Inc., 1969), p. vii .
2

Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. viii.
7

8

Congress and the President, not the Supreme Court.

He also felt,

however , that in matters between the national and state governments ,
and among the states , the proper courts should make the necessary
deci sions.

Just as the matters between states should be the

responsibility of the national government, the matters between
nations should be the responsibility of the International Tribunal.
Robert Houghwout Jackson was born in the small town of Spring
Creek , Pennsylvania, February 13, 1892.

His growing years and most

influential ones were during the Progressive Era in American politi cs.
Jackson was typical of most Americans his age; no coll ege education ,
only high school.

"His father raised , raced , and traded horses 114

and most of the people he knew and with whom he associated were of
the same profession .

His early opinions and educational beliefs were

directly influenced by the Chautauqua Institute in southwestern New
York, established in 1874 as a summer adult education program .

These

were the forces that shaped Jackson ' s thinking and his way of life
and living .
At the time Jackson attended the Chautauqua Institute there were
some 200 courses being taught by the faculty of leading colleges and
normal schools.

These courses purported to offer the best that the

educational world could afford in the literature, arts , and sciences.
It may be significant that the Chautauqua system of education soon
became known for the expression of liberal views . 5
4 Ibid., p. ix.
5

The Encyclopaedia Britannica , 11th Edition (New York: The
Encycl opaedia Britannica Company , 1910), p . 19.

9

In 1913 he was admitted to the bar after completing a course at
the Albany Law School.

He began practicing law in Jamestown, New

York, and became general counsel for several local public service
corporations.

While Jackson was serving on a commission to study

the New York State judicial system, New York Governor , Franklin
D. Roosevelt, was impressed with Jackson's beliefs and capabilities.
Later, when Roosevelt became President of the United States , he
appointed Jackson as general counsel of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (1934).

In 1 935 he became special counsel to the Securities

and Exchange Commission, and in 1936 , assistant attorney general in
charge of the antitrust division, then, solicitor general of the
United States in 1938.
Jackson became one of Roosevelt ' s cabinet members in 1940 by
accepting the position of attorney general .

Only eighteen months

later he was sworn in as associate justice of the Supreme Court.

In

Washington, Jackson was known as "FDR's brightest young legal eagle. 116
In May 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed him to the War
Crimes Commission serving as chief prosecutor for the United States
due to establishment of the International Military Tribunal.

When

the trial was over in 1946 he returned to the Supreme Court remaining
until his death, October 9, 1954.

He continued throughout to be

vigorous and outspoken.
"Jackson ' s judicial career is the story of the denouement and
dissolution of his political ambitions .

For most small- town lawyers

to become a Supreme Court Justice would mark the apex of one ' s
6 Ibid.

10
aspirations for office and public prefennent;"

7

but for "Bob

Jackson," it was onl y second best to his great accomplishments and
influential speeches during the Nurnberg trial .
II. Aspects of the Speaker's Personality

To be able to analyze the speaker ' s work , more than a
chronological biography is needed.

In this section the writer studies

Jackson's personal ity and specific incidents of his life that helped
to shape the man and his work.

Thonssen and Baird quote Cicero to

the effect that a speaker's character contributes to his success in
speaking if " the morals , principles , conduct, and lives of those who
plead causes , and for those whom they plead, are s u ch as to merit
est eem .... .. 8

He goes on to say that the "feelings of the hearers are

conciliated by a person's dignity, by his actions , by the character
of his life .... 119

Simply stated by John Lord O' Brian , Esq., a close

friend of Jackson ,
"I realize more and more what the factor of personality
means in public life , in providing a man with the g ift of
influence. That elusive element, which I think you will
agree is so often missed by biographers and historians , is
to me a very important element in the evolution of Robert
Jackson. 1110
7

Ibid.

8 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 384-385 .
9

Ibid., p. 385.

l0 Charles s. Desmond, Paul A. Freund, Potter Stewart, and Lord
Shawcross, Mr. Justice Jackson: Fou r Lectures in His Honor (New
York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 1969), 7-8.

11
Gr owing up as a farmboy in northwestern Pennsylvania , Jackson's
formal educat ion wa s limited .

Afte r finishing high school, he

borrowed the money to attend the Albany Law School.
attended for one term , however ,

He only

Thi s brief schooling was the extent

of his formal education which is one of the remarkable factors in
his public success .
He was ambitious and his " rare quali ties of c haracter 1111
were two of the mos t important e l ements that made J ackson a successfu l lawyer and judge .

O ' Brian attributes his success not onl y to his

"unusual ability as a lawyer , but also from the character of his own
personality and the great charm which he exerci sed over everybody
with whom he came in contact .

1112

Jackson was an independent man and held strong convictions .

He

was not e asily persuaded to change his opinions or reverse his
judicial decisions.

He could never have been called a ' yes man . '

One incident of this occurred when a Senator opposing confirmation
of Jackson ' s appointment as General Counsel to the Internal Revenu e
Bureau stated that the Secretary of the Treasury was seeking a
man .'

' yes

Jackson ' s hometown newspaper printed in the ir report of the

1 1 Ibid., p. 8 .
12

Ibid .

12

story that "if the cabinet member requires a 'yes man ' we may expect
Mr . Jackson back home in Jamestown a t an early date ."

13

His

independence was a l so evident in his str-ong outspoken positions on '
political party issues (Jackson was a member of t he Democratic
party) and cases such as the one involving strikers accused of
rioting .

One of his favorite quotations was a line from Kipling:

" He travels farthest who travels alone. 11 14
Another of Jackson' s outstanding characteristics was that of
humility .

He was devoted to his friends and he felt a sense of

obligation to them.

One example is that of a school teache r in

Jamestown: she had taken a special interest in him and helped him
to develop his fine qualities at an early age .

Later, he mentioned

her every time the opportunity arose and told of his appreciation
for her help .
Along with humility Jackson's humor added greatly in molding
the man .

O' Brian said that "he was not given to anecdotal humor or

smart aleck phrases , or telling stories .

But he was gifted with

that old Elizabethan folk humor in the true sense. "

13 Ibid., p . 18.
14 Ibid ., p . 10 .
1 5 Ibid ., p . 13 .

15

13

As for his literary style , he was known for his clarity ,
directness , and simplicity.
figures of speech .

He seldom used metaphors or other

Law professors have said that his writing

developed while on the Supreme Court were of a rich and meaningful
English style.

16

He often spoke to various c lubs and his speeches

were always a success containing both humorous and serious thoughts .
Thus his writing method was also a contributing factor to his personal ity and success .
To conclude , it is
man in a few words.

very frustrating to try to d escribe such a

Perhaps former Chief Judge Charles

s.

Desmond

says it bes t,
"I [ saw] him as a practical dre amer, holding fast to
one of the best and oldest dreams of our race - the
dream of pro mpt and equal justice for all the members
of our free society .... Thus was the country lawyer ,
Robert Houghwout Jacks on at home with the people who
loved and trusted him. 111 7

III . Social Setting at Nurnberg

The task of reconstructing the social setting in which speeches
are given is challenging .

16

.

Ibid., p. 9.

17 Ibid., p. 28 .

It must be realized that " speeches are

14
events occurring in highly complex situations " and that " not all
events happening at a moment of cri sis or momentous public occasion
are likely to be recorded . 11 18

I n the situations that are recorded

the decision as to what to record a nd what to omit has a great impact
on the speeches and how they are anal yzed .

It would be impossible

to analyze a speech from the speaker 's written style and a simple
examination of the tex t

"without regard to the e vents which gave

rise to the delivery of the speech ."

19

In this section the critic studies the social setting at
Nlirnberg and the events that led to the trial .
The German people as a whole were never indicted b ecause it
was the feeling of the four victorious powers that t h e crimes we re
not the results of the general population , but a result of the
"terror of the concentration camps and the police state ." 20

Justice

Jackson in his opening speech stated , "We have no purpose to
incriminate the whole of the German people .

We know that the Nazi

.
21
Party was not put into power by a maJority of the German vote •.• . "

18

Thonssen and Baird , op. cit ., p. 312 .

19 Ibid .
20

Eugene Davidson , The Trial of the Germans (New York: The
Macmillan Company , 1966 ), p . 7 .
21 Ibid.

15
.
22
The German people themselves , however , felt a "collective guilt"
and a sense o f responsibility for what had happened .
"In Nil.rnberg as in the result of Germany the threadbare peopl e
who had survived the war cared very little what was in store for the
men who i n the space of twelve years had helped to make the German
Reich the master o f Europe and to destroy it. 11 23

The tragi c and

inhumane t r eatment of the people was s till too real in their minds
and little sympathy for the war c riminals could

pe

f e lt.

The nations conducting the trial, the United States, the United
Kingdom, the French Republic , and the U, S .S .R. , were very strong i n
their feelings also , and cited " violations of the law and customs of
war , criminal acts against the civilia n population of occupied
nations , and crimes against peace a nd conspiracy to wage aggressive
war

11 24

as the basis for the Nlirnberg trial.

As for the courtroom atmosphere , the same type of animosity was
present.

One of the defendants, Albert Speer , recalled ,

22
Ibid.
23
24

Ibid.

Robert K. Woetzel , The Nlirnberg Trials in International Law
(New York: Frederick A . Praeger , Inc ., 1960) , p . 6 .

16
"we encountered only hostile faces, icy dogmas . The only
exception was the interpreter's booth. From there I might
expect a friendl y nod. Among t h e British and American
prosecutors there were also some who occasionally
manifested a trace of sympathy. I was taken aback when
t h e journalists began laying bets on the extent of our
penal ties , and t heir list of those slated for hanging
sometimes included Ime] . 1125
There were also spectators in the gallery looki ng down on the
proceedings and down on the defendants.

Another of the defendants,

Hans Fritzche , wrote,
" •. . these visitors gazed at us ... as if we were animals in
a circus and I could not help being struck by t he cruel
contrast between the a tmosphere of a social function
which they brought with them into a court and the everpresent shadow of the gallows wh ich loomed over us . ... A
German lawyer, about six feet away , [pointed] out each
of us in turn to a group of school girls and [explained]
after the manner of a tourist guide, who all [of us
were] . 1126
Thus, the social setting at Niirnberg, both inside and outside
the courtroom, was one of distrust and hatred, with a bitter taste
left by the d estruction and terror caused by those on trial.
IV. The Audience

One of the Aristotelian concepts of rhetoric is concerned with
audiences.

Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering

25 Albert Speer, Inside The Third Reich (New York : The Macmil lan
Company, 1970), p. 514.
26 Hans Fritzche , The Sword in the Scal es (London: Allen Wingate
Publishers, 1953), p. 68-69.

17
all the possibl e means of persuasion in any subject. 1127

Thonssen

and Baird interpret this definition to mean that "rhe t o ric is an
instrument by which a speaker can . . . make ?n adjustment to a situati o n
composed of himself, his audience , his subject , and the occasion . 11 28
Aristotle believed , as do most all writers and critics , that the
.
29
"audi ence dete rmine ' s the speech's end and obJect ."

An important

aspec t of the speech situation is the " speaker-audience relationship . "

30

Certainly in Jackson's situatio n his entire speeches a nd

their written style and delivery were geared toward persuading his
audience .

In the case of trials the audience i s most importan t in

determining the speech ' s " end and object. 11 3 1
In discussing the audience of the trial two d i visions are made.
These are the same divisions as used in the section on the social
/

setting :

inside and outside the courtroom.

First , inside the courtroom .
members and four alternates .

The tribunal consisted of four

The judges were :

27

Aristotle ,
The Rhetoric of Aristotle , trans. Lane Cooper ,
(New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts , Inc., 1960), p . 7.
28

29

Thonssen and Baird, op. cit. , p . 15.

Ibid.

3 o Ibid .
31

Ibid .

18

"Sir Geoffrey Lawrence , representing the United Kingdom,
who was elected Chairman of the Tribunal; his alternate,

Sir Wi lliam Norman Birkett; Mr. Francis Biddle , representing
the United States, and his alternate, Judge John J. Parker;
M. le Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, representing France,
and his alternate, M. le Conseiller Falco; and MajorGeneral I. T . Nikitchenko, representing the Soviet Union,
and his a l ternate, Lt.-Colonel A. F. Volchov. The
prosecution was in the hands of Mr. Robert H. Jackson,
Chief of Counsel for the U.S.A.; Sir Hartley Shawcross,
Ch ief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom; M. Francois de
Menthon, Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic; and 32
General R. A. Rudenko , Chief Prosecutor for the u.s.s.R. "
"The accused had the services of 27 leading counsels, 54
assistants , and 67 secretaries. " 3 3 During the proceedings
[the judges] appeared dressed in their judicial robes,
with the exception of the Russi ans, who wore military
uniforms. 1134 (The French wore gold-coloured robes; the
35
Americans and British, plain dark gowns.)
Originally 24 men were to be tried, but on October 25 , 1 945,
Robert Ley col!lTlitted suicide .

The trial of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen

und Hal bach had been postponed indefinitely owing to serious illness.
Martin Bormann who was not in the custody of the Tribunal was tried

32 Woetzel , op. cit., p. 1.
33 Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Lee b , The Nurnberg Trial
(Cleveland, Ohio : The World Publishing Company, 1962).
34 Davidson, The Trial of The Germans , p. 20.
35 Fri' tzch e , op. ci' t ., p. 69 .
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in a bse ntia.

The other defendants were Herman Wilhelm Goering ,

Joachim von Ribbentrop , Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Hans
Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Alfred Rosenberg , Julius Streicher , Fritz
Sauckel, Alfred Jodl , Arthur Seyss-Inquart , Rudolph Hess, Walter
Funk , Erich Raeder , Baldur von Schirach, Albert Speer , Constantin
von Neurath , Karl Doe nitz, Hjalmar Schacht , Franz von Papen , and Hans
Fritzche.

The d e fendant groups and organizations were: The Leader-

ship Corps of the Nazi Party; Die Schutzstaffeln , known as the SS;
Der Sicherheitsdienst , known as the SD ; and Die Geh eime Staatspolizei,
known as the Gestapo , or Secret State Police ; Die Sturmabteilungen,
known as the SA ; the Reichscabinet; and the General Staff and High
Command of the German Armed Forces .

36

The courtoom was on the second floor of the Palace of Justice i n
Nlirnberg , Germany and held some 600 people.
courtroom were:

37

The witnesses in the

33 for the prosecution , 61 for the defense , and 143

38
·
·
who gave evi'd ence f o r t h e d efen d ants b y way o f interrogatories
;
altogether there were 240 witnesses and 300,000 sworn statements 39
presented in the case .

Among others admitted were the interpreters

36 Woetzel , op . cit. , p . 1-2 .
37 Davidson , The Trial of the _Germans, p . 21.
38 Woetzel , p . 2 .
39

Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit ., p . 94 .
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who translated the trial into four l angu_a ges; English , German ,
Russian , and French .

"Every word was simultaneously translated ..•

and every seat in the room was fitted with earphones and a dial
which permitted the listener to switch to any of the four languages .''
Court stenographers , news reporters , and those of special capacities,
such as George Bailey who was a Russian Liason and InterpretorTranslator

41

were also part of the audience .

The photographers , film

operators , etc . "hailed from every country under the sun and spoke
every imaginable language , and their equipment ranged from the
smal l est handcameras to the largest motion picture machines on robust
tripods , many of them were German manufactured . 1142

"The press box

held 250 newspapermen who had come from all over the world ... But only
five German press representatives were admitted . 1143

" • • • all members

of the prisoners' fami lies were specifically debarred from the
hearings.

Jodl's plucky wife alone was able to gain permission to

attend the court and she came in the capacity of assistant to her
husband's counsel. 1144

In the gallery "were smartly- dressed women ... ,

4 o Ibid.

41

George Bailey , Germans (New York : World Publishing Company,

1972) .

42

43

44

Fritzche, op. cit ., p . 64 .

Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit. , p. 93 .
Fritzche , op . cit . , p. 68 .

40
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but they were the wives of officials of the victorious nation s who
had come to l ook down from their e minence on the scene in which their
husbands were to distinguish themselves."

45

It must be noted , however ,

that the number of people in the courtroom varied from day to day .
The audience outside the courtroom varied from day to day also .
It can be said that the entire worl d was the audience for the
Nilrnberg trial because of the news r eporting and widespread publicity.
The final speeches of the defendants were heard over radio.

Albert

Speer said that " since these speeches were to be broadcast in ful l
over radio , they had special significance. 1146
Suc h was the audience of the Nurnberg trial.

Again quoting

Thonsse n and Baird , " Critics of oratory are generally agreed that
the effectiveness of oratory is a function of a udience adaptation;
that it must be regarded in the light of what people do as a result
of hearing the speech."

47

Obviously , the effectiveness of Jackson's

opening and closing speeches to the Nilrnberg trial were dependent
upon the audience: t he judges for their verdicts and the rest of the
world for their realization that everyone "must now be aware that they
too may be condemned as international criminals , if they offend
against the laws of nations, if they instigate or· prepare wars of
45

Ibid.

46 Speer , p
o . ci' t . , p. 519 .
47

Thonssen and Baird, op . cit ., p . 79.

22
aggression , if they apply laws that are in violati on of the laws of
humanity, or if they persecute groups or persons whose rights are
recognized by most civi lized nations ."

48 Woetzel, op . cit., p . xiv .
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CHAPTER III
PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA

I. Establishment of Criteria

This study of Justic Jackson ' s speeches approaches rhetorical
criticism not from the traditional me thod of analysis which is to
examine a n orator's work on the basis of literary style and means
of persuasion , but from an analysis of the speaker' s ideas and t he

.

" action fostered by the speech."

1

It is not t h e intention of this

study to imply that t h e importance of literary styl e and means of
persuasion do not weigh as heavily as the importance of the speaker 's
ideas on the social setting to the overall success of the work .
However , the primary concern of this study is the method of evaluating
the " pattern of thought and action . 11 2

The approach , therefore , will

be focused on the speaker ' s ideas and the relation of those ideas
to the social setting .
The decision to focus th~ study of Jackson ' s ideas and their
relation to the social setting is based upon the circumstances of
the Nilrnberg trial and the importance of that trial not only to the
defendants , but to the world and legitimate warfare .

1

2

Thonssen and Baird , op . cit. , p . 72 .

Ibid .
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Thonssen and Baird in Speech Criticism state that "the ideas
which live within the memories of succeeding generations , and the
ideas whose integrity are tested and appraised more often in l ater
history, are the one ' s which deliberative speakers have developed
in addresses on the burning issues of their time . 11 3

Certainly the

Niirnberg trial was a burning issue of its time and Jackson ' s
addresses made during the course of the trial are worthy of analysis
from the viewpoint of the ideas presented.
In order to test and appraise Jac k son ' s speeches, their logical
content, validity , and significance must be examined .

The method of

evaluating the integrity of ideas , according to Thonssen and Baird ,
" should be determined on the basis of how ful ly a given speech
enforces an idea ; how closely that enforcement conforms to the general
rules of argumentative development; and how near the totality of the
reasoning approaches a measure of truth adequate for purposes of
action ."

4

Although the integrity of ideas cannot be determined by

any specific set of rules , a critic must obtain a method either
established by himself or another source .

Therefore in this study

the method recognized by Thonssen and Baird will be employed in
analyzing the integrity of ideas in Justice Jackson ' s speeches of the
prosecution.

3

Ibid ., p. 334 .

4 Ibid .
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As a r e sult of the method use d f o r this s tudy , J ack s on ' s
attitudes t o ward man and the soci e ty in whic h he l ive s mus t be
e xamined to fully unde r s t a nd the me aning of his speech es a nd their
impl ica tio ns .

This exami natio n r e quires a d i scl o sure of the fol l o wing

a ttitude s :
1.

J ack son ' s ideas , h o w t h e y were presented and h o w he
de veloped the m.

2.

J ackson ' s p h ilosophy of law a nd judic i a l proce dure. This
involve s a n i nv es~ig ation of J ack s on ' s l ife , edu cation, a nd
car eer; a l so a probe into J ack son 1 s supre me court d e cisions
as o utlined in Chapte r II ~

3.

What was Jackson attempting t o do?

4.

Was his attempt consistent with h i s own back ground and t h e
c i rcumstances of the trial ?

This methodology constitutes t h e standard by which the ideas we re
analyz ed i n J ackson ' s speeches .

II . Obtaining and Establ ishing the Auth enticity of the Texts

The complete te xt o f Jackson ' s speeches were obtained from a
book enti tled The Nilrnberg Case wri t ten b y Rob e rt H. Jackson himself.

S .Jae k son , 1 oc . c it
. .

.....

5
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The speeches in this book were taken from the o~iginal transcripts of the tr i al .

Justice Jackson in the Preface of the book ,

states that the speeches and cross-examinations ''As here presented
are taken from the official transcript before revision . 11 6

The book includes:
I.

Report to the President of the U.S. , June 7 , 1945 ,

II .

Four-Power Agreement for Trials and Charter of Jnte r n
national Military Tribunal, August 8 , 1 945 ,

III .

Open~ng Statement for the United States , November 21 ,
1945.

IV .

The Law Under Which Nazi Organizations Are Accused of
Bei_ng Criminal , Arguments by R,obert H. Jackson,
February 28, 1946,

v.
VI .

Closing Address, July 26, 1946,
Excerpts from Cross-Examination of Defendants .

In the Preface Justice Jackson states,

" The mission of this book is to make conveniently available
fundamental information about the world ' s first international
criminal assizes . There are four thousand documentary exhibits
making up some seventeen thousand pages which could be read by
7
all , but few will find the time or take the time to read them ."

6
7

Ibid. , p . x.
Ibid. , p . v .

27

Jackson ' s book condenses the trial into 269 pages which can be easil y
read.

By including the whole of his opening and c l osing statements ,

Jackson gives the circumstances -of the c~se and the conclusion allowing
his readers to understand "what was being done in their name - abroad and
to invite support for the principles on which the case was founded."

8

III. Selection of Speeches

The speeches sel ected for t his study are the f o llow~ng :
1.

Justice Jackson's opening address to the jur y during
the Nlirnberg trial. The speech was delivered November
21 , 1945 a t the Palace of Justice , NUrnberg , German y .

2.

The summation or closing statement to t h e jury during
the Nlirnberg trial. The speech was del ivered July 26 1
1946 at the Palace of Justice , Nlirnberg , Germany.

Thonssen and Baird say that

1

'oratory to be great must deal with

ideas which make a difference i n the affairs of men and states . "

9

The Nlirnbe rg trial dealt with ideas which made a difference in the
affairs of men , states , and nations.

The beginning of that trial

with the statement of what was at stake, the predicted effect that
its outcome would have on the world, receives a most forceful state~
ment i n the opening address,

The same is true of the summation which

would lead to a decision that would cha_nge the course of international
law and the laws of l egitimate warfare .

The study is therefore

focused upon the two speeches .
8
9

Ibid. , p . v .
Thonssen and Baird , op. cit ., p. 332.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECHES

I . The Counts of Indictments and Defendants

Preliminary to the analysis of the speeches the writer fee l s
that a brief identification of each defendant will be helpful.

The

following will enabl e the r eader to understand who the defendants
were , their participation in the war crimes, and the counts upon
which they were indicted.
First , the counts upon which they were indicted .
Count 1: Crime of plotting and waging wars of a_g gression.
Count 2: Crime of wars in violation of nine treaties to which
Germany was a party .
Count 3: Crime of violating International Law.
Count 4: Crimes against humanity .

1

Second , brief identifications of the defendants .
Hermann Wilhelm Goering was the chief defendant .

He was the

former Reichsmarschall who was designated as Hitler ' s successor ,

He

was called "the leading war aggressor, both as political and as
military leader; . .. the director of the slave labor program and the

l Jackson, The Nurnberg Case , p. 82 .
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creator of the oppressive program against the Jews and other races ,
at home and abroad ."

Near the end of the war Hitler accused him of

high treason and ordered his arrest.

Goering was i ndicted on all

four counts.
Joachim von Ribbentrop was the Foreign Minister of the Nazi
Reich.

He participated in the aggressive plans against various

nations and was held responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.

Ribbentrop was considered one of the vai nest and most

incompetent of the men around the Fueher.

He was indicted on all

four counts .
Wilhelm Keitel served as Chief of the High Command of the German
Armed Forces.

He participated in the aggressive p l ans against

several countries1 war crimes, and crimes against humanity .

He signed

the not orious "Nacht und Nebel" decree which provided that in
occupied territories civilians who had been accused of crimes of
resistance against the army of occupation would be tried only if the
death sentence was likel y; otherwise they would be handed over to
the Gestapo and transported to Germany .

Keitel was indicted on all

four counts.
Ernst Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and S.D.
and head of the Reich Security Head Office , an organization which
supervised the murder of approximatel y four million Jews in
concentration camps .
four.

He was indi cted on counts one , three , and

30

Hans Frank served as Governor- General of Poland under the Nazi
regime .

He was called "a willing and knowing participant in the

use of terrorism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of Poland
in a way which led to the death by starvation of a large number of

peopl e; in the deportation to Germany as slave laborers of over a
million Poles ; and in a program involving the murder of at three
million Jews. "

Frank was indicted on counts one , t h ree, and four .

Wilhelm Frick was the supreme Reich authority in Bohemia and
Moravia.

He was held responsible for terrorism of the population ,

s l ave l abor , and the deportation of Jews to the con centrati on camps
for extermination.

Frick was indicted on all four counts.

Alfred Rosenberg was the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories .

He was supposed to have played an important

role in the preparati on and planning of the attack on Norway, and to
have hel ped in formul ating the policies of Germanisation, exploitation,
forced labor , extermination of Jews and opponents of Nazi rule in the
Occupied Eastern Territories.

Rosenberg was indicted on all four

counts .
Julius Streicher was the publi sher of "Der Stlirmer" , an antisemitic weekly newspaper.

He was held responsible for incitement to

murder and extermi nation at a time when Jews in the East were being
killed under the most horrible conditions.
one and four.

He was indicted on counts

31
Fritz Sauckel held the pos ition of Plenipotentiary-General
for the utilization of Labour .

He was in charge of the forced labor

of more than six million men and wome n.

Sauckel had br~ught convoys

of foreign workers to Germany from all the countries of Europe.
Sauckel was indicted on all four counts.
Alfred Jodl had been Chief of the Operations Staff of the High
Command of the German Anned Forces .

Jodl was held responsible for

participating in the planni_ng of an attack agains t various nations ,
and for supporting the notorious Commando Order a n d the directive
for " Case Barbarossa" which contains a plan to e liminate Soviet
commissars .

He also ordered the evacuation of a l l persons in

northern Norway and the burning of their homes so that they could not
be of help to the Russians.

Alfred Jodl was also indicted on all

four counts .
Arthur Seyss-Inquart was the Reich Commissioner of the
Netherlands.

The Judgment states that he "was a knowing and

voluntary participant in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
which were committed in the occupation of the Netherlands. "

These

crimes included the deportation of J ews to the Auschwitz
extermination camp , the ruthless suppression of all opposition to the
Gennan occupation , the economic exploitation of the Netherlands
without regard for rules of the Hague Convention , and the deportation
of forced labourers to Germany .

He was indicted on all four counts.
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Rudolph Hess was the former Deputy to Hitler and successor
designate to the

Flihrer

after Goering .

The British jailers

thought him insane , but a report from the prison psychologist , stated
that there was nothing to show that Hess did not realize the nature
of the charges against him, or was incapable of defending himself.
Hess was involved i n German aggression against Austria, Czechoslavakia,
and Poland.

He was indicted on all four counts .

Walter Funk had participated in the early Nazi program of
economi c discrimination against the J ews.
the Reichsbank.

Funk was the President of

The Tribunal felt that Funk knew about and deliberately

ignored the fact that, while in concentration camps, the gold from
eyeglasses and gold teeth and fillings of the victims had been
removed and stored in vaults of the Reichsbank.
in the util i zation of concentration camps .

He a l so participated

Walter Funk was indicated

on all four counts.
Erich Raeder had served as Commander-in- Chief of the German
Navy from 1935 to 1943.

It was said that the invasion of Norway was

the decision of Raeder and not Hitler.
crimes on the high seas.

He was charged with war

Raeder was indicted on cou nts one, two , and

three.
Baldur von Schirach was involved in the deportation of Jews from
Vi enna after he became Gauleiter of Vienna and had been the former
Reich Youth Leader.

He was indicted on counts one and four.
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Albert Speer was the Reich Minis ter of Arms and Munitions.
was the head of all German war production .

He

The cou rt felt that Speer 's

establi shment of blocked industries did keep many l aborers in their
homes and that in the c l osing stages of the war he was one of the few
men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to
take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production
fac ilities , both in occupied territories and Germa ny .

He carried

out his opposition to Hitler ' s scorched earth progr am i n some of the
Western countries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it "at
conside r able per sonal risk."

Speer was indicted on all four counts .

Con stantin von Ne urath was a Reich Mini ster without Portfolio ,
President of the Secr et Cabinet Council , and a member of the Reich
Defence Counc il.

He advocated the e l imination of the Czechoslavakian

intelligentsia and other groups which might resist Germanizati on.
v~n Neurath was indicted on all four counts.
:&arl Doenitz was the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and
Head of State succeedi ng Hitler.

He was charged with waging aggressive

war a nd wi th permitt ing the Commando Order to remain in ful l force
when he became Commander-in- Chief.

He was indicted on counts one ,

two , and three.
Hjalmar Schacht was a banker and world-renowned "prestidigitat or"
of German finances.

He originated the plan that rescued the German

mark from its worthlessness in 1923 and then a decade l ater suppli ed
the loans and compl icated financing that made German rearmament
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possible .

Justice Jackson said that he was either "a great war

criminal or ... nothing. " Near the end of the war he had been sent to
a concentration camp by Hitler.

Schacht was indicted on counts one

and two .
Franz von Papen was the Vice-Chancellor in the first Hitler
Cabinet of 1 933 , and later Minister to Vienna and Ambassador to
Turkey .

He was indicted on counts one and two.

Hans Fritzche had been the Head of the Radio Division of the
Pro~aganda Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Pol itical Organization
of the Greater Germany. He was indicted on counts one, three, and
four .
Martin Bormann had served as Head of the Nazi Party Chancell ery
and Secretary to Hitler .

He was involved in the persecution of

Jews and in furthering the slave labor program.

He also transmitted

instructions allowing the use of firearms and corporal punishment
on prisoners of war , and was responsible for the lynching of Allied
Airmen .

He was indicted on counts one , three , and four .

The above information concerning the d efendants was taken from
the following sources :
E_ugene Davidson , The Trial of the Germans {The Macmillan
Company : New York , 1966), pp . 24-27.
Robert K. Woetzel, The Nlirnberg Trails in International Law
{Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.: New York, 1960), pp . 7-16 .
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Following is a chart of the d e fendants , the counts upon which
.

they were indicted, and on which they were found guilty or innocent .

Goering
He ss
Bormann
v on Ribbe ntrop
Keitel
Kaltenbrunner
Ro senberg
Frank
Frick Streic her
Funk
Schacht
Doenitz
Raed e r
vo n Schirach
Sau c k e l
Jodl
v o n Pa pen
Seyss-Inquart
Speer
v on Ne urath
Fri tzche

Count 1

Count 2

Count 3

Count 4

G
G

G
G

G

G

I

I

G
G
G

G
G
G

G

G
G
G
G

G

G

G
G
G
G
G
G

I
G
G

G
G

I
G

I
I
I
I
I
I

G

I

G

G
G

G
G

I
I

I

G

G

G
G

I
I
I

I

G

I

2

Ibid ., p . xii-xiii .

G

I
G
G

G
G
G

G
G
G

G
G

I

I

G

2
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II . The Opening Address
November 21, 1945

In order to apply the a nalysis to the i nventive process of
Jackson's speeches , the writer returns to Chapter III for the method
and criteria upon which this study i s based .

The logical content ,

val idity, and significance, therefore , will be examined ,

The first

endeavor is to identify the ideas; second , to examine their logical
content and validity ; and third , to evaluate the development and
significance of the ideas .

The fo llowing are the ideas and philosophy

of Jackson as they appear in his opening addres s .
Justice Jackson began his opening address by recognizing the
importance and "grave responsibility"

that "the first trial in
3

history for crimes against the peace of the world " carried with it.
He justified the trial by stating that "the wrongs which we seek to
condemn and punish have been so cal culated , so malignant and so
devastating , that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored
because it cannot survive their being repeated . ''

4

In a ll of Jackson ' s remarks and justifications of the trial ,
this statement alone had been the greatest .

The possibility of

another aggressive war would pe rhaps have brought total destruction
to the world .

The fear of such a war was truly the main concern of

the prosecution .
3

4

Ibid ., p. 30.
Ibid. , p. 30-31 .
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Jackson also justified the trial being conducted by the four
victor nations saying " that four great nations, flushed with victory
and stu_ng with injury stay the hand of vengenance and voluntarily
submit their captive enemies no the judgment of the law is one of
the most significant tribu tes that Power ever has paid to Reason . 1' 5
The l ogical content and validity of this idea should be obvious to
all and not only to persons in the l _e gal field .
Logically this was the best approach for Jackson to take in the
~eginn~ng of his opening address , Throughout the address he gives
the reasons for the trial, the Tribunal , and the counts of
indictment explaining and defining each in a chronological and
justifiable sequence .

Although Jackson cited the trial itself as a
6

significant tribute that ''Power ever had paid to Reason'' , certainly
his openi_n g address should be included in this tribute.
Jackson turned next to the definition of the Tribunal .

He

defined it as " nove l and experimental ," but not "the product of
abstract speculations nor ... created to vindicate legalistic
theories.''

7

The utilization of International Law concerned with

aggressive war was a representation of the "practical effort of fou r

5

Ibid., p . 3 1.

6 Ibid .
7

Ibid.
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of the most mighty of nations, with the support of seventeen more. "

8

For the logic of organi zing the Tribunal , Jackson turned to the
common sense of mankind:
"The comnon sense of mankind demands that l aw shall not
stop with the petty crimes by little people. It must
also r each men who possess themselves of great power and
make deliberate and concerted use of it set in motion
evils which l eave no home in the world untouched. " 9
It was for this reason that Jackson justified the Tribunal and its
leadership by the victor nations.

In truth common sense did

recognize the top Nazi leaders as t he real war criminals.

Jackson at

one point referred to the law and its precedent over all men, placing
even t h e King under God and the law.
The consequences of the accuseds ' deeds Jackson found to be
far-reaching and long lasting.

He pointed out that t h e significance

of the inquest
"was that these prisoners represent sinister influences
that will lurk in the world l ong after their bodies
returned to dust .
[The prisoners were the ] l iving symbols
of racial hatred, of terrorism and violence, and of the
arrogance and crue l ty of power ... of fierce nati onalisms
and of mil itarism, of intrique and war-making which have
embroiled Europe generation after generation , c r ushing
its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its
li fe . nlO
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
lO Ibid.
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Jackson saw a victory for the accused as "an encouragement to all
the evils which are attached to their names .

1111

The significance

here is that civilized nations could not allow such deeds to go
unpunished for fear that they would grow stronger and bring more
destruction .
The purpose o f Jackson ' s address is simply stated , giving
added justification and reason for the trial.

"What these men

stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose, 11 12

to give "undeniable proof of incredible events . ••
crimes Jackson omitted nothing .

13

He was

Cataloging the

He appealed not onl y to logic , but

to emotion as well by discussing the results of the war on the
German people , Jews , Christians , laborers, and the destruction of
land and demoralized society that survived .

He termed the results

"the fruits of the sinister forces that sit with [the] defendants
in the prisoners ' dock . 1114

The development of the effect of the war

and Jackson's appeal to the emotions is most significant because it
began his plea for the jury ' s sympathy and verdicts of guilty .
There were certain limitations and difficulties that left their
mark on the case .

11

12
13

14

Jackson felt it necessary to define these

Ibid .
Ibid. , p . 32 .
Ibid .
Ibid .

40

limitations and difficulties in defense of the " nations and the men
associated in this prosecution . 1115

Some of the important limitations

and difficulties of the case were cited as: the difficulty of
bri_nging within " the scope of a single litigation the developments
of a decade , covering a whole Continent , and invol ving a score of
nations , countless individuals , and innumerable events ; 1116 ~d the
limitations caused by the lack of time to research due to the world ' s
demand for " immediate action.

11 17

This concern for the difficulties

and limitations by J ackson was to make all those involved aware of
the attempt being made by the prosecution to exercise justice and
fairness while at the same time recognizing that they were only
human and succeptible to error.
In regard to the dudgment made by the victor nations , Jackson
remarked , "We must never forget that the record on which we judge
these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us
tomorrow . "

18

The significance of this statement is that the trial

is not important just for the moment, but that it would serve as a
corner stone for all such crimes and trials of this nature to be
held thereafter .

The Nilrnberg trial would serve as a guide for

international law and i nternational

judgment and history would be

the judge of the success and impact of the trial.

15 Ibid .
16 Ibid .
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 33-34 .
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To reenforce the decision to hold the trial Justice Jackson
presented the a lternatives that were possible . Through the use of
rhetorical questions he shows t hat the o nly course of action was
that of an international trial .
Tribunal .

He then proceeded to justify t he

Using his appeal to logic he stated, ''Realistically , the

Charter of this Tribunal , which gives [the defendants] a hearing ,
is also their only hope.

11 19

Here again his logic is mixed with

emotion as he made the act of the Tribunal appear to be a personal
favor to the defendants.

The significance h e wished to bring out is

that although these defendants were unjust and unfair to t heir enemi e s ,
the Tribunal was magnanimous enough to afford them the opportunity
to receive the justice and fairness that they were unwilling to
give .

The guilt of the accused involved "moral as well a s legal

wrong"

20

and the Tribunal i ntended to prove all the counts of

indictment "by books and records . "

21

From this Jackson implied that

in no way could anyone logically find the defendants not guilty .
J ackson focused on the guilt of the defendants and denied the
collective guilt of the German people .
wrote ,

19
20
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Albert Speer in his memoirs
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"The trial began with the grand, devastating opening
address by the Chief American prosecutor, Justice Robert
H. Jackson. But I took comfort from one sentence in it
which accused the defendants of guil t for the regime ' s
crimes, but not the German people. This thesis
corresponded precisely with what I had hoped would be a
subsidiary result of the trial: that the hatred directed
against the German people which had been fanned by the
propaganda of the war years and had reached an extreme
after the revelation of those crimes, would now be
focused upon us, the defendants. 1122

Jackson ' s statement was: "We woul d also make clear that we have no
purpose to incriminate the whole German people . "

23

It was true that

the German people had suffered and could not help but bear the
burden of guilt.

Jackson went on to explain, "The German people

should know by now that the people of the United States hold them in
no fear , and in no hate. 11 24

The denial of collective guilt was a

significant factor of the trial and was a major element that many
had hoped would be part of the outcome.

Here again, it was only

logical to condemn those of high command because singly they
organized and controll ed all that happened.
Referring to what he called "the Nazi nightmar e ," Jackson said,
"The Nazi nightmare h as given the German name a new and sinister

22

Speer, op. cit., p. 520.

23 Jackson, The Niirnberg Case , p. 35.
24 Ibid.
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significance thr~ughout the world whic h will retard Germany a
. 25
century."

The l ogic and validity of this statement would in time

prove to be untrue .

Alth~ugh it was a powerful and seemingly

significant statement during his opening address history was to prove
him wrong .

Albert Speer also comment ed on this statement appeari_ng

to be more l _ogical in his ideas and more valid in h is reasoning.

He

attributed the " cr iminal events of those years " to two elements ;
an ou_tgrowth of Hitler' s personality and the implementation o f
technol _o gy .

26

Jackson felt that the major element was the attempt

to form a "master race. 11 2 7

Speer ' s r easoni _ng about future destruction

a nd danger in all nations was that it would not be a threat from
Germany , but the threat of technology :
"The more technol ogical the world becomes, the greater is
the danger .... A new great war will end with the
destruction of human culture and c ivilization . There is
nothing to stop unleashed technology and sci ence from
completing its work of destroying man which it has so
terribly begun in this war . . . . 28
11

Speer also saw this nightmare as that of the future, not the past:

25

26
27
28

Ibid ., p . 36 .
Speer, op . cit ., p . 521 .
Jackson , The Nurnberg Case , p. 36.
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"The nightmare shared by many people that some day the nations of
the · world may be dominated by technology .. .

Therefore, the more

technological the world becomes , the more essential will be the
demand for individual freedom and the self-awareness of the
individual human being as a counterpoise to technology . 1129

The

preceding statements from Speer were taken from his cross-examination
by Justice Jackson .

On this point J ackson clearly loses.

Jackson ' s method of delivering his opening a ddress was to
return to the specifi c purpose of the trial throughout his message .
He thus far has discussed responsibilities , "justifications , the
Tirbunal, fairness , and the trial ' s limitations returning always to
the purpose and terrible crimes for reenforcement of his case .

In

the continuing segments of the address he gives a chronological
overview of the war and development of the Nazi Party again inserting
the purpose and destruction that occurred .

The following is a

chronological listing of Jackson ' s ideas as they appear in the next
section of his opening address .
In discussing the central theme of the case Jackson dealt with
the following points :
The Fact and the course of war is history.
Beginning Sept. 1, 1 939 , Germans overran many countries .

29

Speer , l oc . cit.
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Those countries included: Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands,
France , Belgium, Luxembourg, the Balkans, Poland, the Baltic
States, and parts of Russia.
The war did not just happen - it was planned and prepared.
The defendants all united with the Nazi Party in a plan which
they well knew could be accomplished only by an outbreak of
war in Europe.
The offices and officials were dedicated to criminal purposes
and committed to use criminal methods.
Jackson's purpose was to open the case by dealing with the
common plan or conspiracy to achieve ends possible only by
resorting crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.
The case was concerned with the brains and authority
responsible for all the crimes.
At this point Jackson took up the subject of the lawless road
to power in which he discussed the following historical records:
The chief instrumentality of cohension in plan and action
was the National Socialist German Workers Party, known as
the Nazi Party.
Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader, known as the Fuhrer,
in 1921.
February 24, 1920, at Munich, the Nazi Party publicly
proclaimed its program.
The proclamation carried with it certain commendable demands
such as, profit-sharing in the great industries, general
development of provision for old age, creation and
maintenance of a healthy middle class, a land reform suitable
to national requirements, and raising the standard of health.
There was also a demand for loyalty and patriotism.
The Nazi Party from its inception contemplated war putting
together the necessary organizations.
The Nazi Party also declared that no Jew or any person of
non-German blood could be a member of the nation.
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The Party promised an authoritarian and totalitarian program
for Germany.
Restrictions were placed on education, the press, publications ,
and religion .
The Party platform read: "The leaders of the Nazi Party swear
to proceed regardless of consequences-if necessary, at the
sacrifice of their lives.
Jackson now switched to the fulfillment of the party pledge
which entailed enumeration of the following points :
The foreign objectives were to undo international treaties
and to wrest territory from foreign control , as well as
most of their internal program.
The first effort was to subvert the Weimar Republi c by
violent revolution.
This effort fail ed and the Nazi Party turned to plans
for its capture.
J ackson next elaborated on the Nazi Party structu re comprising
the historical chronol ogy of the Nazi organization as follows:
The Nazi Party, under the Fuhrerprinzip , was bound by an
iron discipline into a pyramid , with the Fuhrer, of
Adolf Hitler, at the top.
The structure then broadened into numerous Leadership Corps :
Die sturmabteilungen (SA), Die Schutzstaffeln (SS), Der
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) , and Die Geheime Staatspolizei
(Gestapo).
The Nazi Party h ad its own source of law, courts, and police.
The chain of command was military.
Adolf Hitl er became Chancellor of the German Republic on
January 30 , 1933.
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The manner in which the Nazi power was consolidated was of
obvious significance and Jackson elaborated the following points in
this connection:
This consolidation and the steps involved embraced the most
hideous of crimes against humanity.
This consolidation was used as a means of perfecting control
of the German state.
The Nazi program was recognized by other nations as a
desperate program for a people still suffering the effects
of an unsuccessful war.
During this period there appeared to be two governments
existing in Germany - the real and the ostensible; the
German Republic form and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party.
On February 27 , 1933 the Reichstag building was set on
fire, it had been the symbol of free parliamentary
government and the Nazis were believed to have staged
the fire.
The Nazis accused the Communist Party of the crime.
On February 28, 1933 Hitler obtained a decree from President
von Hindenburg suspending the guarantees of individual
liberty contained in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic.
Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 , and 153 were suspended.
These articles that had given Germans certain rights included:
deprivation of personal freedom by a public authority ; the
right of every German ' s home as his sanctuary , the secrecy of
letters, and a ll postal, telegraphic and telephonic
communications; freedom to express opinions in speech , i n
writing, in print, in picture form or in any other way; the
right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without giving notice
and special permission; the right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to criminal law; and
property was guaranteed by the Constitution.*

* (Note: The Constitution itself authorized von Hindenberg to
temporarily suspend these fundamental rights "if the public safety and
order in the German Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered.")

48

This decree had no provisions for restoring these rights
leaving the Nazi policy and party formations completely
unrestrained and irresponsible.
This enabled the Nazis to carry out their battles for complete
domination,
The Nazis focused their persecution upon certain elements of
society among which were representative of the working class.

This

section of his speech enumerated these Nazi efforts:
When Hitler came into power , there were three groups of trade
unions in Germany: the General German Trade Union
Confederation (ADBG), the General Independent Employees
Confederation (AFA), and the Christian Trade Union.
The working class had little to gain by war and would not
support the war efforts.
The Nazis required that the working people be stripped of
power and whipped into new and unheard-of sacrifices as
part of the Nazi war preparation.
The Nazi Party issued an order for attacks on the ADGB and
the AFA. The SA and the SS organizations were to take union
properties and to take into custody persons who came into
question .
They began to carry out these orders on May 2, 1933. The
confiscation was done by the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (Labor
Front).
On May 19, 1933 , by government decree "trustees" of labor,
appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions of all
labor contracts, replacing the process of collective
bargaining.
Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor,
but they forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring
people.
Jackson commented, " Robert Ley , the field marshal of the
battle against labor , answered our indictment with suicide.
Apparently he knew no better answer."
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The next social element singled out for persecution was
religion and this signaled the battle against the churches:
The Nazi Party a l ways was predominantly anti-Christian in
its ideology.
The Nazis' crime was not in that they were pagan in their
own beliefs, but because they persecuted others of the
Christian faith.
Religious sects such as, Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Penecostal Association were persecuted.
A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic
Church.
After the occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions
went on with greater vigor than ever.

The Nazi crimes against the Jews aroused more notoriety than
any of the other Nazi efforts at persecution.

Jackson proceeded to

elaborate these crimes:
The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed
by the Nazis were those against the Jews.
The Jews in Germany, in 1933, numbered about 500,000.
The crimes against the Jews incl uded: expropriation of
Jewish property , discriminations against the Jewish
religion, placement of impediments in the way of success
in economic life, organized mass violence against Jews,
physical isolation in the ghettos, deportation , forced
labor, mass starvation, and extermination.
The avowed purpose was the destruction of the Jewish people
as a whole, as an end in itself , as a measure of preparation
for war, and as a discipline of conquered peoples.
Jackson commented, "History does not record a crime ever
perpetrated against so many victims or one ever carried
out with such calculated cruelty."
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On February 24, 1942, Hitler proclaimed that "the Jew will
be exterminated. "
Under the Niirnberg decrees of Sept. 15 , 1935 , the SD was
made responsible for the guardianship of the J ews.
On November 10 , 1938, an order was given for all Jewish
synagogues to be blown up or set fire. This was later
called the "Kristallnacht" or the night Jewish property
was plundered and churches burned .
Following this attack Jews were sent to concentration camps.
Jackson then presented official German doc\.Ullents that gave
detailed reports of their actions against the Jews .

In keeping with a comprehensive coverage of Nazi criminal
actions Jackson reported historical data revealing the terrorism
and preparation for war:
The German mistreatment of Germans is now known (at the
time of the trial) to pass in magnitude and savagery any
limits of what is tolerable by modern civilization.
The purpose of getting rid of the influence of free labor ,
the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction
to the precipitation of aggressive war.
Terrorism was the chief instrlllllent for securing the cohesion
of the German people in war purposes.
Concentration camps were opened a l l over Germany .
Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings became routine.
Deportations and secret arrest were labeled "Nacht und
Nebel" (Night and Fog. )
The victims of concentration camps were used for cruel
and inhumane scientific experiments .
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Gennany became a vast torture chamber.
Financiers, economists, industrialists joined in planning
and promoting elaborate alterations in industry and finance
to support an unprecedented concentration of resources
and energies upon preparations for war.

The period during which the German government t ested the will
of the Allies , was seen by Jackson as a scheme of experiments in
aggression :
The Nazis advanced only as others yielded keeping in a
position to drawback if they found persistence to be
dangerous before resorting to open aggressive warfare.
On March 7 , 1936 , the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland.
On March 12, 1936 , they began the invasion of Austria.
On March 15, 1939 , the Nazis seized Bohemia and Moravia.

At this point , Jackson interrupts his chronological report
stating that he "will not prolong this address by detailing the steps
leading to the war of aggression which began with Poland on September
1 , 1939.

The further story will be unfolded to you from documents

including those of the German High Command itself . 11 30

3 o Jackson, The Nurnberg Case, p. 68.

These documents
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did indeed prove that the war was a planned war of aggr ession ,
Jackso n reminded the jury that "even the most warlike peopl e s
have recognized .. . some limitations on the savagery of warfare'.' and
that "rules to that end have been embodied in international
conventi ons to which Germany became a party . 1131

The code had

prescribed certain restraints as to warlike treatment ,

Once again

Jackson justified the international trial by show0g that Germany
had not uphe ld an interna tional agreement.
The Nazi treatment of their enemy forces could not have been
stated more c l early than in a letter written February 28 , 1942 by
Rosenberg to Keitel.

The letter stated , "The fate of the Soviet

prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the
greatest extent . 1'

32

This letter Jackson submitted as evidence on

behalf of the prosecution - a logical choice of evidence as well as
a signif icant one .
The Prosecutor returned to the horrible crimes and the ruthl ess
manner in which they were committed .

He seemed to linger

unnecessarily long on these matters .

Although he occasionally

c omme nted on not going into detailed a ccounts , he did so frequently .

31
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His r easoning is obvious , merely for reenforcement and to point the
mos t tragic of a ll portraits of the wa r .

He a lso a ccused numerous

defendants of specific crimes and supported his accusations with
documents written by the defendants .

Realizing this Jackson

r emark e d:
"I shall not go into further details of the war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi
ganster ring whose leaders are b efor e you . It is not
the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the
individual crimes .. .. My task is only to show the
scale on which these crimes occurred , and to show
that these are the men who were in the responsible
positions and who conceived the plan and des ign which
renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that
the plan was actually executed by others . 1133

This he acco~plished and more .

With the chronological review finished Jackson then turned to
the law of the case .

He began by asking the question , "Is the re no

standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such
conduct? 1134

He then proceeded to answer the question beginning

with an e xplanation of the legal philosophy of the Charter of t h e
tribunal .

The Charter was not only an agreement by the fou r

victorious nations , but of "twenty-one governments , representing an
33
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overwhe lming majority of all civi lized nations . 11 35

Jackson , along

with his colle_agues , also rec_o gnized that this "dec l aration of the
law

1136

was not decl ared at the time the defendants enacted the crimes

maki_n g the declaration somewhat of a shock to the defendants .

He

stated, however , that '' their pr_o gram defied ~ l aws , 11 3 ~ and he
cited statements and documents by the High Command and the defendants
in which they openly stated that they were defying the law because
it did not adhere to their purposes .

These statements and documents

were definitely helpful to the prosecution.

The prosecution knew

that anything it would say or accusations that i t would make would
only be valid if they could present concrete evidence to support
them - and this they did .
Jackson went on to explain the counts of indictment which have
already been listed at the beginning of this chapter.
The principle that war is unjust and illegal can be found in
many documents, pacts, and agreements among nations .

Some of these

include such significant charters a s the Briand~Kell_ogg Pact, 1928;
the Geneva Protocal of 1924; the Eighth Assembly by the League of
Nations in 1927; and the Sixth Pan American Conference of 1928 . 38

35 Ibid .
36 I bid.
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- -

55
All of the meetings recognized wars of aggression as an interna t ional
crime.

With such documents as these already established the Chart er

of the Tribunal was not creati ng a new law, but in actuality carrying
out a law already adopted by the c ivilized nations .

Once more

Jackson ' s justification of the Tribunal was strength ened.
I n the foll owi ng section much of Jackson's own ph i l osophy
seeps through as he attempts to interpret and expl a i n international
law.

He admitted that there was no judicial p r ecedent f or the Charter

but that "he was not disturbed by the l ack of judi cial precedent
for the injury Ithe p r osecution proposed] to conduct. 11 39

He made

these comments about international law to substantiate his l ack of
concern for judicial precedent.
"International law .. . is an outgrowth of treati es and
agreements between nations and of accepted customs ...
[It] is not capabl e of develop ment by the normal
processes of l egi s l ation for there is no continuing
international legislative authority .. .. It g r ows , as did
the Common Law, through decisions reached from time to
time i n adapting settl ed principles to new s ituations .
The fact is that when the law e vo l ves by the case
method . . . it advan ces at the expense of those who wrongly
guessed the law and learned too l ate their e rror .. .. the
events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the
s t andards of crimes, ... whose perpetrators this Tribunal
is convened to judge and punish f i ttingl y 40
11

•

Again more justification for his case.

39 Ibid., p. 85.
4 o Ibid.
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Pointing out certain problems and weaknesses of the Charter,
Jackson discussed i ts fail ure to define a war of aggression as a
maj or oversight .

For his definition o f a war of aggression , Jackson

used the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at London
on July 3, 1933 , one of the most authoritative sources of International
Law on the subject . · He listed the four acts of that definition
and one of his own as the criteria for defining a war of aggression
for the purposes of this case .

He concluded the matter with thi s

statemen t , "It is upon such an understanding of the law that our
evidence of a conspi racy to provoke a nd wage an agressive war is
prepared and presented . 1141
Another problem that Jackson felt could have prolonged the trial
was that the position held by the Tribunal and the German state on
the conditions causing the war differed .

To avoid such a problem

or extension of the trial he made c l ear the concern of the Tribunal .
The cause of the war he said was for "history to unravel . 1142

The

concern of the prosecution was ''that whatever grievances a nation
may have .. . aggressive warfare is an i llega l means of settling those
grievances or for altering those conditions . 1143

41 Ibid, p . 87 .
42
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The Charter amidst its problems and weaknesses did r ecognize
the law of individual responsibility .

The individual responsibility

was directed toward those who corranitted "acts defined as crimes , or
who [incited] others to do so , or who [joined] a common plan with
other· persoris ,_ groups, or organi zations to bring about their
commission . 11 44

The Charter also stated that "one who has committed

c riminal acts may not take refuge in superior orders nor in the
doctrine that his crimes were acts of states . ,, 45

If this had b een

permi ssabl e all of the defendants could have used that doctrine .

As

in all events , however , the chart e r realized that under certain
circumstances a person cannot be held responsibl e for his actions,
but the defendants were not among those exceptions.

All of the

defendants had p l ayed major roles in the war and were responsible
for their actions .

To further justify the Tribunal making clear

that their Charter was not solely c r eated for this trial , but in
effect a compilation of laws enforced by a ll the individual nations
he remarked .

"Every day in the courts of countri es associated in

th is prosecution , men are convicted for acts that they did not
personally commit but for which they were held responsible because of
.
.
,,46
membership in illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies .
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Jackson also pointed out to the jury that by rendering a verdict of
guilty _against the o_rganizations i t "will render prima facie guilt
for thousands upon thousands of me mbers now in custody of the United
.

States forces an d oth er armies ,

,,47

The ~ogical approach for Jackson to take in e nding his opening
address was to remind the bench how all that he had said was
applicable to the case - and this he did.

He complete d the circle

by return~ng to the Tribunal and its responsibility .

The great

importance and significance of the trial are stated throughout his
address , but he felt it necessary to bri ng the matter to the bench ' s
attention in his conc lusion as well.

He described the court as

" the first court ever to undertake the difficult task o f overcoming
the confus i on of many tongues and t h e conflicting concepts of jus t
procedure among diverse systems of law, so as to reach a common
judgment. 1148
In summing up Jackson intertwined emotion with logic and tried
to make the United States appear more than fair in its participation ,
He pointed out that

" the United States is perhaps in a position to

be most dispassionate, for having sustained the least injury , it is
49
the least animated by vengeance . 11
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While the United States had
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sustained the least injury it was acknowledged by Jackson that
"twice in my lifetime , the United States has sent its young manhood
across the Atlantic , drained its r esources , and burdened itself
with debt to help defeat Gerrnany . 11 50

He contined , " the United States

cannot ,. generation after generation , throw its youth or its resources
onto the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of bal ance b e tween
Germany ' s str ength and that of her enemies , and to keep the battles
from our shores . 1151

The possibility that another such war could

take p l ace makes the importance of this trial even more significant,
This was what Jackson wanted; not onl y for the judgments to be
guilty for the defendants of this trial , but to remind others
contemplating a similar war of aggression of the consequences that
they too would have to face .
Al though making this point Jackson was " aware of the weaknesses
of juridical

action alone to contend that in itself [the) decision

under this Charter [cannot] prevent future wars . 1' 52
only be hope that it would do so .

There could

His sense of fairness and equal

j ustice for a ll was evident as he made c l ear to all concerned "that
while t his law first applied against German aggressor s .. • and if it

so
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is to serve a useful purpose .,. must condemn aggression by any
other nations, includi_n g those [who sat in judgment] , 1153
Jackson saw the trial as a representation of "ma nkind's
desperate effort to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen
who have used their powers of stat e to attack the found ati ons o f
the world ' s peace and t o commit aggression against the rights of
their ne_ighbors. 1154

He also envisione d the trial as a ''part of the

great effort to make the peace more secure ,"
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These remarks would

only be valid if the j udgments reached were in favor of the
prosecution .
A final appeal b y Jackson was made in the name of Civilization ,
His concluding words were very powerful and moving , placing the case
in the hands of the jury .

All of his logic , justification, a nd

significance were for the last time put into words : "Civilization
. .. does not expect that you can make war impossibl e .
e xpect that your j uridical

It does not

action will put the forces of Inter~

national Law , its precepts , its prohibitions and , most of all , its
sanctions , on the side o f peace , so that men and women of good will
in all countries may have leave to live by no man ' s l eave , underneath
the law."
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I n giving a fina l analysis the writer quotes Lord Shawcross,
during the time of the Nuremberg ( s i c )

Trial Lord Shawcross was

known as Sir Hartley , the Chief British Prosecutor, who i n
commenti_n g on Justice Jackson I s Openi_n g Addre~s remarked , "None
of the arts of the actor [were] here .

This [was] no dramat ic

declamation , but calmly in words of dignity and authority the
demand of a lawyer and statesman too that law and justice shoul d
in t he end prevail.

11 57

III . The Closing Address
July 26 , 1946

July 26 , 1946 , Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered his closing
address to the Niirnberg Tribunal at the Palace of Justice, Niirnberg ,
Germany .

As in any closing statement , he surrunarized all that had

taken place during the eight months of the trial.
Explaining what had taken place Jackson stated , "We have
introduced evidence which embraces as vast and varied a panorama
of events as ever has been compressed within the framework of a
litigation.

57
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With this statement he wanted to remind the Tribunal

Desmond , Freund , Stewar~, and Shawcross , op . ci t. , p . 125 .
Jackson,

The Nurnberg Case , p. 120 .
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that this was not an ordinary trial nor were the events leadi_ng to
the trial ordinary ones .

'I'he rec_o gnition of these factors were:

most important to J ustice Jackson ' s summation .
Jackson also re~ognized the limitations of his Closing Address,
He remarked , " It is impossible in summation to do more than outline
with bold strokes the vital s of this trial ' s mad a nd melancholy
record , which will l ive as the historical text of the twentieth
century's s hame and depr avi ty , 11 59
documents before them if needed

The jury had the facts and
Jackson's responsibility was not

to recreate al l that had happened , but to conc l ude the case for
prosecution in this last appeal to the jury .
Throughout Jackson ' s Opening Address he had br~ught out the
significance of the trial and the impact that it was to have o n
history ,

He too , in his Closing Address again commented on the

trial ' s historical effect .

Jackson had concluded his Opening Address

with a plea for the rise of civilization and not its fall .

He also

opened his Closing Address with this same plea : "The deeds are the
overshad owing historical facts by which g enerations to come will
remember this decade .

If we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent

the repetition of these barbaric events, it is not an irresponsible
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prophecy to say that this twentieth century may yet succeed in
.
.
th e d oom o f civi
· · 1 ization
·
·
bring~ng
, u60

Jackson saw that a long

range effect of the tria l had been to persuade the bench of its
responsibility to posteri ty and to possible future trials of this
kind .
Jackson felt it necessary to mention the law of the case in h i s
summation , but on ly to mention i t , not to dwell o n the matter.
said , ''I shall not labor the l aw of the case .

He

The · pos ition of t h e

United States was explained in my opening statement , 1161

The main

point that he did bring out , however, was that a l t h ough the
defendants had asked for the legal basis of the trial to be
nullified this could not be adhered to because the Tribunal did not
have the power to set aside or to modify the Agreement that had been
made among the four victor nations and eighteen others , 62

One o f

the reasons for the defendants' plea for the denouncement of the
law Jackson believed was based on the premise that a ny man who has
been held accountabl e for a crime by the law does not have a good
opinion of it .

Germany had uncondi tionally surrendered and

technically the Allies were still in a state of war with Germany .
The Military Tribunal · in effect was a continuation of the war effort

60 Ibid .
61 Ibid ., p . 1 21.
62 Ibid.
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by the Allied nations.

As a result the "Internati o n a l Tribunal

[was] not b ound by the procedural a nd substantial refinements of
our respective judicial and constitutiona l systems , nor [did] its
rulings introduce precedents into a ny country's internal civil
system of justice"

63

The Charter itself was not the only significant accomplishment
of the nations involved;

J ackson called the International Military

Tribunal a ''unique and emergent c haracter of this b ody " which should
not be overlooked.
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By drawing attention to this Jac kson had

placed t h e bulk of the r esponsibility of the proceedings on the
Tribunal.

He told the Tribunal that they must "[seek] guidance not

only from the I nternational Law but a l so from the b asic principl es
of jurisprudence which are assumptions of c i vilizatio n and which
l~ng have found embodiment in the codes o f all nations . 11 65
Referr~ng to justice for the defendants , Jackson stated that ,
"History will know that whatever could be sa id, [the Nazis ] were
allowed to say .

They have been given the kind of trial which they,

in the days of their p omp and power, never gave to any man ,"

66

He

tried to impress upon the Tribunal t h e significance of the power
nations ' quest for a f air trial for the defendants .

63 Ibid. , p . 122 .
64

Ibid ., p. 121.

65 Ibid.,
p. 122

66

Ibid .

He cited this

65

greatness of the Four Powers to be one of the elements that made
the m great : " .• . fairness is not weakness ,

The extraordinary fairness

of [the ] hear0gs [was ] an attribute of our strength . 11 67

He pointed

out that even though the prosecution had given the defendants ever y
possible opportunity to prove their innocence they were not able

to do so .

" The fact is," he had s a i d , "that the testimony of the

defendants has removed any doubts of guilt which , •. may have existed
before they spoke ."

68

Because of the defendant ' s own testimonies and the conclusive
evidence presented in the cases against them , the weight of passing
judgment was made easier to bear for the Tribunal.

Jackson

remarked , "They have helped write their own judgment by
condemnation .

11 69

The only reason the court had studie d the Nazi

war tactics was because "their creed and teachings [were ] important
7
.
·
on1 y as evi. d ence o f motive,
purpose , k now 1 e d ge, and intent
. ,, o
This study had been necessary in order for the prosecution to present
to the Tribunal a clear cut case which could be proven, not only by
the defendants• testimonies , but also by official documents and
records .

67

68
69

70

Ibid .
Ibid .
.
Ibid,
Ibid . , p. 123 .
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An admitted weakness , as Jackson pointed out , was that the
"world had failed to provide political or lega l remedies which
would be honorable and acceptible alternatives to war ."

71

However

strong this factor was it still did not excuse the Nazis of their
crimes .

Any civilized country should have been capable of using a

more r easonable method for obtaining their goals than that of
~ggressive warfare he b e lieved .
Jackson emphasized the fact that , "The United States [had]
no interest which would be advanced by the conviction of any
defendant if we have no t proved hi~ guilty on at least one of the
counts charged against him in the Indictment.

1172

He did not see a n

unjust verdict as a victory for the prosecution .
Lawyers often refer to their cases as an open and shut case ,
In the following statements of Jackson 1 s address he found this to
be s u ch a case : " . .. in swmnation we now have before us the tested
evidences of criminality and have heard the flimsy excuses and
paltry evasions of the defendants ,

The suspended judgment with

which we opened this case i s no longer appropriate ,

The time has

come for final judgment and if the case I present seems hard and
.
.
.
th
.d
.
73
uncompromising , 1.t 1.s because
e evi ence makes 1.t so . "

The

writer r eviewing the case a l so saw the case as ' open and shut ' and
agreed with Jackson,
71 Ibid .
72

Ibid .

73 Ibid ,

67

Jackson ' s next step was to discuss the case impressively , but
simpl y .

He saw the specifics of the case as being " diplomacy ,

naval development and warfare , land warfare , the genesis of air
warfa re, the politics of the Nazi rise to powe r , the finance and
economics of totalitaria n war , sociol ogy , penology , mass psychology ,
and mass pathology. 11 74

The discussion of these specifi c s h e would

leave " to e xpe rts to comb the evidence and write volumes on their
speci a lties : '.' 75

His intention in thi s secti on was to "pi cture in

broad strokes the offenses whose acceptance as lawful would threaten
the continuity of civilization . 1176 Quoting Kipling he d escr ibed his
attempt as a " splash at a ten~league canvas with brushes of comet's
.
,, 7 7
h air .

J ackson's began with a diagram of the crimes o f

the Nazi r _egime .

One significant point emphasized that the case

was against the Nazi regime and not the German p e ople as a whole .
It included the Crimes of the Nazi Regime :
The seizure of power and subjugation of Germany to a
police state .
The preparation and waging of wars of aggression.

74
75
76
77

Ibid., p . 1 24 .
Ibid .
Ibid .
Ibid .
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The warfare in disregard of international law .
The enslavement and plunde r of populations in organized
countries .
The persecution and e xte rmination of Jews and Christians .
Following this discussion Jackson went on to the central crimes ;
an admitted war of aggression:
The war of aggression did take place .
From the moment the Nazis came to power, eve ry member had
worked to prepare for war .

In outlining these crimes Jackson directed the court ' s attention
to the defendants sayi.n g that "a glance over the dock will show that
despite quarrel s among themselves , each defendant played a part
which fitted in with every other, and that all advanced the common
pan
1 .

,,78

Jackson followed with a brief run down on the defendants

and their major involvement in the criminal events .

This part of

his Clos~ng Address was primarily a review of the statements he had
made in his opening remarks .

By repeating them in the summation he

hoped to refresh the jury's memory on the cruelty, injustice , and
inhumane treatment administered by the defendants a nd the
o rganizations on trial .

78

Ibid . ,
__

p. 141.
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Nearing the close of his address , Jackson found it necessary
to examine the charges of responsibility against the defendants .
He felt that these charges could be reviewed on the basis of
common responsibility , not individual r esponsibility .

The defendants'

answers to these charges he listed as : 1) admission of limited
responsibility; 2 ) putting the blame on others ; and 3) admiss ion of
. . l
79
the crimes , butth at t h ere were no crl.ffiina s.

The defendants denied the charge of conspiracy stati_ng that the
Nazi plan was a common plan , not a conspiracy .

Jackso n pointed out ,

however , that "the Charter concept of a common plan really represents
the conspiracy principle in an international context ."

80

To contest

this charge further , the defendants said that there was no conspiracy
involving aggressive war for the following reasons :
"l) none of the Nazis wanted war; 2) rearamament was only
intended to provide the strength to make Germany ' s voice
heard in the family of nations ; and 3) the wars were not
in fact aggressive wars but were defensive against a
'Bolshevik menace '. 81
11

In proving that these statements were false Jackson referred
to documents and testimonies by the defendants which did not back
up their denial of conspiracy charges .
sure we were building guns .

79 Ibid . , p . 147 .
80

Ibid.

81 Ibid.
, p . 148 .

Comments such as , "To be

But not to shoot.

They were only to

70
,

,

I

give us we_ight in negotiating. '

82

were used .

,
Logically, Jackson

did not need to continue his defense on this charge - he had clearly
proved thei~ guilt.
The ch~rge of waging an ~ggressive war was Jackson's next
concern .

The defendants had .3:rgued that the "wars were not aggressive

and were only intended to protect Germany against some eventual
danger from the 'menace of Corru:nunism' •
" argument of self-defense"
established in the record"

84
85

11 83

This Jackson turned their

sayipg that certain "facts clearly
made their argument invalid .

He cited

these facts as 1) the enormous and rapid German preparations for
war ; 2) the repeatedl y avowed intentions of the German lead ers to
attack ; and 3) the fact that a series of wars occurre d in which
German forces struck the first blow , without warning, across the
.
borders of other nations
. 86 Obviously , these f acts aided the
prosecution and Jackson proved guilt on the second charge .

He said,

"In all the documents which disclose the planning and rationalization
of these attacks , not one sentence has been or can be cited to show
a good-faith fear of attack . "
82
83
84
85
86
87

Ibid .
Ibid ., p. 149 .
Ibid .
Ibid .
Ibid .
Ibid ., p . 150 .

87

71

The defense had tried to prove that the defendants had no
alternatives to their actions because they were under the power
and rule of a dictator .
point.

Jackson was quick in reacti ng on this

He reminded the court that

" the defendants may have becane slaves of a dictator,
but he was their dictator. To make him such was , as
Goring [had] testified, the object of the Nazi movement
from the beginning . 11 88
Here again Jackson documented and proved the defendants ' guilt.
For additional reenforcement J ackson asked to be allowed to
"turn devi l ' s advocate 11 89 for a momen t .

He said ,

" I admit that Hitler was the chief villain. But for
the defendants to put all blame on him is neither
manl y nor true. we know that even the head of state
has the same limits to his senses and to the hours of
his day as do lesser men. He mu st rely on others to be
his eyes and ears as to most t hat goes on in a great
empire. Other legs must run his errands; other hands
must execute his plans. On whom did Hitler rel y more
than upon these men in the dock? 11 90

With this question he encompassed the whole of the trail and placed
the answer directly in the hands of the jury .
The worth of the defendants' testimonies was a l so questioned
by Jackson.

He drew attention to contradictory remarks in their

88 Ibid. , p . 152.
89 Ibid., p. 160.
9 o Ibid.
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individual testimonies which discredited their validity and
importance .

"We have presented to this Tribunal an affinnative

case b ased on incriminating documents which are sufficient .. .

to

r equir e a finding of guilt on count one against each defendant , 11 91
he said.
Jackson concluded ,
"In opening this case I ventured to predict that there
wo uld be no serious denial that the crimes charged
were committed and that the i ssue would concern the
r esponsibili ty of particular defendants. 11 92 "The
defendants now ask this Tribunal, " be continued , "to
say that they are not gui lty of planning , executing ,
or conspiring to comnit this long list of crimes and
wrongs .... If you were to say of these men that they
are not guilty , it would be as true to say there has
been no war, there are no s lain, there has been no
crime. 11 93
His responsibility h ad been fulfilled and his commitme nt to the
Nurnberg trial had ended.
Returning to Lord Shawcross ' l ecture on Jackson during the
Nurnberg trial , he a l so referred to the Cl osing Address .

Lord

Shawcross remarked ,
" It was not a long speech. It was a speech illuminated
by humanity, clearl y and vivi dly illustrati ng the crimes
that had been committed , the rule of law which was to be
vindicated. It was a speech that no one who heard it
will forget: a speech which future historians and statesmen
would do wel l to remember . 11 94
91 Ibid., The Nurnberg
·
Case , p. 161 .
92 Ibid., p. 151.
93

Ibid., p . 163.

94 Desmond , Freund , Stewart, and Shawcross , op . c it . , p . 1 30.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Justice Jackson once wrote, "The hard months at Nuremberg (sic.)
were well spent in the most important, enduring and constructive
work of my life. 111

In the pages of history , Jackson wanted to be

remembered most for the important part he played in the Nlirnberg
trial.

Perhaps many of his Supreme Court decisions were more

significant in shaping our nation ' s laws, but his remarkable
contributions to the establi shment of an international system of
law certainly was his greatest accomplishment.
In October 1941, while the United States claimed neutrality,
President Roosevelt stated, "One day a frightful retribution would
be exacted."

2

Again in August 1942 Roosevelt "warned the Axis Powers

that 'the time will come when they will have to stand in the Courts
of Law in the very countries they were oppressing and answer for
their acts.

111 3

These early remarks of President Roosevel t and first

thoughts of a judicial trial were proposed long before other
countries had even considered such actions and also before Justice
Robert H. Jackson became involved.
1
2
3

Once the proposal had officially

Desmond, Fre und, Stewa rt, and Shawcross , op . cit., p . 90.
Ibid ., p . 91.
Ibid., p . 92 .
73

74
been made and other countries had accepted it , the organization of an
International Mil itary Tribunal began .

It was with this beginning

that "its fulfillment and success depended more upon the wisdom, the
vision , the organization al capacity , and the leadership of Justice
Jackson than upon anything else . 11 4

Finally on August 8 , 1945 , the

"Agreement and Charter of the Internat i onal Tribunal was dul y signed.
As Mr . Francis Biddle later wrote: ' Robert Jackson ' s tireless energy
and s kill had finally brought t he four nations together- a really
e xtraordinary feat. '"

5

Jackson's predominate concern was to prove the guilt of the
defendants on the c harges o f "violation of the laws of legitimate
warfa r e , waging a war of aggression , and crimes against humanity.

11 6

This h e wanted to achieve by presenting sound evide nce and reasoning
to confirm the defendants guilt.

His presentation of concrete

evidence - documents, records , films, photographs , and witnesses was quite impressive .

As for his reasoning he used for the most part ,

the inductive method: "A result of [the speaker ' s ] observation of
specific instances or concrete facts ... [formulating] a general
conclusion or principle deriving from observed data ."
4
5

7

To establi sh

Ibid., p. 91.
Ibid . , p. 114 .

6 New Republic , "To the Nuremberg Court", Robert H. Jackson,
August 26 , 1946 , p. 232- 33.
7 Thonssen and Baird, op . cit. , p. 348.
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the general guilt of the defendants and organizations on trial
Jackson had pointed out specific discrepancies in their testimonies,
official orders and personal letters written by them to determine
their guilt.

His use of inductive reasoning was most effective and

did accomplish his ob jectives.
Although Jack son ' s major achievement , the organization and outcome of the trial as a whole, was s uccessful , some of his minor
attempts were not .

Many have criticized Jackson for particul a r

incidents that o ccurred during the trial.

"Jackson was not immune

from the human frailties we all possess ," stated Lord Sh awcross ,
"Sometimes he was impatient, occasionally he was irritable. 118

Mr.

Justice Birkett felt that at times Jackson was "inclined to be
pompous or even vain. 11 9
Probably Jackson ' s most unsuccessful moments o f the trial came
during his cross-examination of Goering .
is certainly a brillant cross - examiner.

"Your prosecutor Jackson
Even when he is not sure

what he will find , he b eats on the bu sh to see if a rabbit jumps out
- and sometimes it does, 1110 Schacht had remarked.

To t his Goeri ng

had replied, "Wait until he starts on me - he won't have any nervous
! person] to deal with. 1111

" Goering himself was a remarkable man.

8 Desmond, Freund , Stewart, and Shawcross , op. c it . , p. 1 25 .
9 Ibid.
l O Leonard Mosley , The Reich Marshall: A Biography of Herman
Goering, (New York : Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1 975) , p. 410 .
11

Ibid .

A
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c r iminal n o doubt," said Lord Shawcross ,
" But a courageous one, a man of great ability and of
outstanding personal ity . One fe lt of him that in
some respects h i s personality could dominate the
whol e proceedings if he sought to make i t so . . ..
This was a man to be cross-examined in one way onl y b y following the f i rst axiom of cross-exami nat ion in
a criminal t rial, which is never to ask a question
without knowing that there is only one inescapable
answer to be given to it - usuall y a ' yes ' or a ' no ',
and b y that process to lead the witness up to the
l ast fatal but inescapable response . 11 12

This approach Jackson did not use , however , "His forte was , rath e r ,
advocacy and argument .

11 13

Shawcross cited Jackson ' s lack of success

as due to his intellectual honesty : "His whole case was to expose the
evil philosophies with which the Nazis had sought to dominate t h e
world : this inevitably involved him in putting matters of opinion
and in an argumentative rather than a factual exchange . 11 14

Jackson' s

failure , perhaps , was not entirely his fault but also that of the
Tribunal in allowing Goering to make long statements in response to
Jackson' s questions and not intervening when the situation developed
and retaining control of the proceedings .

15

As a resu l t , the British

team had " spent the night digg i ng u p documents signed by Goering
12
13

14
15

Desmond , Freund , Ste wart , and Shawcross , op . cit ., p . 125-26.
Ibid ., p . 126.
Ibid ., p . 127.
Ibid.
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personally showing h im to be a . .. bandit and a thu g . 1116
On the other hand , not all the comments about J ackson were
negative .

Sir Elwyn J ones , Attorney- General of Engl and , said that

" Jackson was the real driving force that by sheer e nergy and wil l
got Nuremberg (sic )

under way . 11 17

Another English Judge has

written ,
" One of the very nice things about Jackson was his
friendliness to all the lesser lights . .. and the
other junior members of the British delegation . He
· was always approachable and ready to help if he
could . 1118

The criticisms of the trial were not all directed toward
Jackson .

The trial itself has been criticized by many and the

historical value of the trial h as been questioned.

"We must never

forget ," Jackson had said in his Opening Address , "that the record
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which
history will judge us tomorrow .

1119

Tomorrow has come and some of

the judgments that have been made are not favorable .
has written ,

16
17
18
19

Ibid .
Ibid , p. 1 28 .
Ibid .
Jackson, The Nurnberg Case , . p. 33-34.

George Bailey

78

"In destroying the German state by refusing to recognize
the authority of the German law the victors at Nuremberg
(sic) undermined the concept of the state in breaching
i ts defined local authority by proclaiming a higher
responsibility t o an abstraction called 'international
l aw ' .... I am not a historian but in the course of my
general reading I have yet to encounter a spectacle of
slovenly thinking on the part of professional intellects
compar abl e to that of the prosecution of Nuremberg (sic)
,. 20

Hans Fritzsche remarked,
"A trial of war-guilt and atrocities at t he end of a
l ong conflict may perhaps, in the abstract , be considered
a good ~hing. One may welcome the effort to establ ish
a s upreme international tribunal charged with the duty
of seeing right is done and pronouncing from aloft a
New Law for the peoples of the world .. . . But Nuremberg
(sic) failed to live up to such lofty aims; t here the
victors uttered the anathema only against the vanquished.
They sought to establish the guilt of various Germans ,
even of the entire German people; but would break off a
hearing whenever they saw that the deeds of the Allies
might be measured by the same yard- stick as those of the
defeated. Yet the gravest fai l ing of the Nuremberg (sic)
trial is this : i t failed to transcend the guilt of
11 21
individuals and reach the deeper causes of disaster .

20 Bailey , op. cit ., p . 102-103.
21 Fritzche , op . cit., p. 334-335 .
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Joe Heydeck e r and - J o h annes Leeb ended their account of the
Nurnbe rg tria l with this statement: " Someh o w the men and events of
1946 h a v e b ecome inc r edibly remote . 11 2 2
Lo r d Shawcross r efl ected ,
" Looking back now, over twenty years later at a worl d stil l
t o rn wi th l awl essness and war , I cann ot preten d t h at t h e t ria l
has so far had the effect on the course of histo r y for which
we h a d h oped . It i s a matter of bitter disappgintmen t , i n deed
o f shame , i n which perhaps we all must share . 11 23

Even t h o u g h Lo rd Sha wcross had recognized the weaknesses o f t he
trial he concluded ,
" The Nurembe r g (sic) judgment still stands as a clear statement
of the law of Nations . If in the end mankind is to survive at
all its principles must prevail. 11 24
Just as Lord Shawcross pointed out the strengths , as well as
the weaknesses of the trial , so did others .

The criticisms of the

trial appeared to be more plentiful from the Ge rmans and German
sympathi zers .

The praises came from historians , newsmen, and

profess i onal s , etc .

Major H. R. Trevor-Roper, a Bri tish Intelligence

Officer i n charge of the investigation into the truth of Hitler ' s
death , stated from London by wireless to the New York Times ,

22
23

Heydecker and Leeb , op. cit . , p . 388 .
Desmond , Freund , Stewart , and Shawcross , o p . c i t ., p . 135 .

24 Ibid., p . 1 36.
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"What will history say to t h ese trials? . .. No such court
has been so universally .xecognized o r its prestige so
successfully maintained ... Had it not been for this
e xposure [of the most p rivate documents and most secret
archives ] it would have been possible for a n ew German
movement in ten ye ar ' s time to mai ntain that the worst
of Nazi crimes were Allied propaganda easily invented in
the hour o f such total victory . That is now impossible . 1125

Justi ce Jackson himself said,
"The Nuremberg (sic) trial of the Nazi war criminals [prov e d ]
that always it is worthwhile to give men a hearing . .. Another
l esson of the Nuremberg (sic) trial is that captives can be
given a dispassionate hearing even in the immediate aftermath
of war. 1126
•

The opinions of these men and countless others have been
record e d ; their validity is stil l to be tested .

Obviously history

has been affected by the Nurnberg t rial and its impact has carried
with it certain contributions as well as certain pitfalls .

After thirty

years , however , the fu ll impact of the trial is perhaps not distant
when its significance and permanent mark on history will be tested .
In the writer ' s evaluation of Jackson ' s

Opening and Closing

Address two factors were considered: What was Jackson attempting to
do and was he successful in his attempt and in keeping with his
background and l egal philosophy?

First , what was J ackso n attempting

25
New York Times Magazine, "The Lasting Effects o f the
Nure mberg Trial , " Major H. R. Trevor-Roper , October 20 , 1946, p . 5 1.
26

New York Times Magazine , - " Justice Jackson Weighs Nuremberg ' s
Lesson ," Robert H. Jackson, June 16 , 1946, p. 12 .
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to do?

Jackson stated in his Opening Address, "My task is only to

show the · scale on which these crimes occurred , and to show that these
are the me n who were in the responsible positions and who conceived
the plan and design which renders them answerable, regardless of the
fact that the plan was actually executed by others. "

27

The writer

believes that Jackson, through his presentation of evidence and
indu ctive reasoning found in both his speeches , made a s killful and
l ogically reasoned case.
b ench.

Jackson spoke simply and directly to the

He made his speeches easy to follow by using such methods

as topical- chronologi c al ord e r and a listing of facts and reasons.
The u se of these methods a lso aided Jackson because he was abl e to
l ead the jury through an historical narrati ve of the war detai l ing
the war crbnes and describing the horrible events that took place.
On the otherhand , his speeches were l engthy and could have been
condensed.

He was repetitious in parts and appears to have lingered

much too long on certain issues .

This Jackson did for reenforcement,

but the arguments were well stated and did not require any added
rhetoric to drive home the point .
bnpressive and very powerful.

Overall, J ackson's speeches we re

They were most instrumental in

determining the outcome of the trial .

Speer had described Jackson ' s

Opening Address as " grand" and " devastating.
27

..

Jackso n , The Nurnberg Case , p. 79 .

28 Speer, op . cit. , p. 513 .

11 28

Lord Birkett
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commented on Jackson ' s advocacy of the trial,
" In the court itself, sitting as I did on the Bench
day by day, I had the opportunity of seeing a superb
exhibition of advocacy , notably in the opening
speech when he outlined the case for the prosecution
in most memorable and striking language, and in the
closing speech when , after many, many months of
evidence, he made the most masterly summing- up of
[the case]. The two speeches have been singled out
by lawyers all over the world as supreme examples of
advocacy . .. One of the marks of the highest advocacy
has always been the ability to make an orderly
presentation to the court of the most complicated facts,
but it is safe to say that never in the history of
criminal trials was so complicated a case ever set
before counsel , and never did any counsel emerge from
it so triumphantly. These two great speeches , in my
opinion , are the superb triumphs of his days at
Nuremberg (sic ) . 11 29
As for consistency in his work at Nurnberg and his earlier work,

Jackson ' s ideas and philosophies remained the same.

He had always

upheld justice and the idea of everyman's right to a trial by jury.
He had assessed the alternatives which were: to free the prisoners,
or to turn them over the the German law, or to turn them over to the
individual countries knowing that Great Britain and the Soviet Union
would shoot them without a trial, or to hold an international trial.

29 Desmond, Freund, Stewart, and Shawcross, op. cit., p. 88-89 .
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To Jackson the on l y l ogical and justifiable alternative was to hold
an international trial.

There was no indication or evidence anywhere

to show that Jackson supported the idea of withholding justice.
Jackson had remarked , "Despite the fact that public opinion already
condemns their acts , we agree that here they must be given a
presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving
criminal acts and t he responsibility of these defendants for their
.

.

comniss1.on.
An

,. 30

important o bservation concerning Jackson ' s struggle for

fairness was that many did not see it as a struggle for fairness ,
but one of injustice .

Leonard Mosley had felt that it was a forgone

conclusion that the Tribunal had found the defendants guilty even
31

before the trial began .

In Jackson ' s favor , however, was the fact

that three of the defendants were acquitted and that others were
only given prison sentences.

The fo l lowing is a list of the

defendants and their sentences:
Herman Goering
Rudolf Hess
Martin Bormann
Joachim von Ribbentrop
Wilhelm Keitel
Ernst Kattenbrunner
Alfre d Rosenberg
Hans Frank
Wilhelm Frich
Julius Streicher
Walthar Funk
Hjalmar Schacht

Hanging
Life
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Hanging
Life
Acquitted

30 Jackson , The Nurnberg Case , p. 34- 35.

31

Mosley , op. cit . , p. 432-433.
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Karl Doenitz
Erich Ralder
Baldur von Schirach
Fritz Sauckel
Al fred Jodl
Franz von Papen
Arthur Seyss - Inquart
Albert Speer
Constantin von Neurath
Hans Fritzche

10 years
Life

20 years
Hanging
Hanging
Acquitted
Hanging
20 years
15 years
Acquitted

31

Note : Goering committed suicide by poison.
Edward A. Parry , speaking of lawyers , said, " the great lawyer
is like the accomplished actor; both occupy the stage for a brief
moment , win applause , and then make their last bow before the cur tain
fal ls, 11 32
lawyer:

Robert H. J ackson fits thi s description of a great
he occupied the stage at N~nberg for a t ime, won the

applause of much of the civilized world , and after some 200
performances made his fin a l appeal to the court .

Unlike the a c t or's

pe rformance , however, it will take decades and perhaps the aftermath
of another g l obal confrontation before the signi ficance of Justice
Jackson ' s performance can be evaluated in its entirety.

31
32

Jackson , The Nurnberg case , p. xii-xiii.
Thonssen and Ba i rd , op . cit. , p. 333.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle . The Rhetor i c of Aristotle . trans . Lan e Cooper .
York: Appleton Century- Croft s Inc ., 1 960 .
Bai ley , George .
Germans .
Company , 1972 .

New

Cleveland , Ohio : The Worl d . Publishin g

Benton , Wilbourn E . Nuremberg : German Views of the War Trial s .
Dalla s~ Southern Methodist University Press , 1 955 .
Dav idson , Eugen e . The Death and Life of Germany .
Al f r e d A. Knopf I nc. , 1 95 9 .
Davi dson , Eugene . The Trial of the Germans .
Macmillan Company , 1966 .

Ne w Yo r k:

New York : The

Desmond , Charles S .; F reund , Paul A. ; Stewart, Potter; and Shawcross ,
Lord . Mr . Justice Jackson : Four Lectures in His Honor. New
York : Coltnnbia University Press , 1969.
Doenitz , Admiral Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days .
Ohio : The World Publ i shing Company, 1959 .
Freidin, Seymour, and Bailey , George .
Macmillan Company , 1968 .

The Experts .

Fritzche , Hans . The Sword in the Scales.
Limited , 1953 .

Cl eveland ,

New York : The

London: Allan Wingate

Heydecker, Joe J. , and Leeb, Johannes . The Nuremberg Trial .
Cleveland , Ohi o : The World Publ ishing Company , 1962.
Jackson , Robert H. The Nurnberg Case .
Publishers Inc . , 1 971 .

New York: Cooper Square

Jackson , Robert H.
The Struggle fo r J udi cial Supremacy.
Vintage Books , p ublished b y Random House , 1 941 .

New Yo rk:

Mosl ey , Leonard . The Reich Marshal: A Biography of He rmann Goerin g .
New York: Dell Publishing Company , Inc . , 1975 .
Schubert , Glendon . Di spassi onate J ustice: A Synthesis of the J u d i cial
Opinions of Rober t H. Jackson. Indianapolis : Bobbs - Mer i l l
Company Inc . , 1969 .
85

86
Scot t, Robert L . , and Brock , Bernard L . Methods of Rhetorical
Criticism. New Yo rk: Harper and Row Publishers , 1972 .
Shirer , Wi l l iam L. The Rise and Fal l of the Third Reich : A History
of Nazi Germany . New York : Simon and Schus t e r Inc. , 1 960.
Speer , Albert .
Inside the Third Reich.
Company , 1970 .

New York: The Macmillan

Steiner t , Marl is G. 23 Days : The Final Collapse of Nazi Germany .
New Yo rk : Walke r and Company , 1969 .
Thonssen , Lester , and Baird , A. Craig .
The Ronald Press Company , 1948 .

Speech Criticism.

New York :

Truman , Harry S . Memoirs . Kansas City Edition , Garden City , Ne w
York: Doubleday and Company Inc. , 1956 .
Vogt , Hannah . The Burden of Guil t .
Press Inc ., 1964.

New York: Oxford Uni versi ty

Woetzel , Robert K. The Nuremberg Trial in International Law.
London : Stevens and Sons Limited , 1960 .

B. Periodicals
Croft , Albert J .
"The Functions of Rhetorical Criti c ism , "
Quarterly Journal of Speech , XLII (Oct ., 1956) , 283- 291.
Nilson, Thomas R. " Interpr etive Function of the Critic , "
Speech, XXI (Spring , 1957), 70- 76.

Western

Wrage, Ernest J. "Public Address : A Study in Social and Intellectual
History , " Quarterly J ournal of Speech , XXXI II , 451-457 .

C. Miscellaneous
The Encyclopaedia Britannica , 11th Edition (New York: The Encycl opaedia
Britannica Company , 1910) , p .19 .
"Justice Jackson Weighs Nuremberg ' s Lesson " , New York Times
Magazine , (June 16 , 1946) , 12- 60 .
"The Lasting Effects of the Nuremberg Trial ," New York Times
Magazine, (October 20 , 1946) , 15- 52.
"To the Nuremberg Court " , New Republi c ,

(August 26 , 1946), 232 - 233 .

" Trial of War Criminals", Department of State Publication 2420 ,
United States Government Printing Office , Washington , D. C . 1945 .

APPENDIX

Definition of Terms
Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 - A pact by which Germany , Italy, and
Japan, in common with practically all the nations of the world,
renounced war as an instrmnent of national policy, bound
themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific
means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies.
"Case Barbarossa" - The code name for the invasion of Russia .
Case Method - A detailed analysis of an individual or group, especiall y
as an exemplary model of medical , psychological, or social
phenomena.
Commando Order - An order by Hitler October 18, 1942, demanding the
extermination of captured Allied conmandos.
Commissar - A deputy commissionar in charge of political indoctrination
and the enforcement of party loyalty.
Common Law - The system of laws originated and developed in England,
based on court decision, and on customs and usages , rather than
on codified written laws.
Covention for the Definition of Aggression in 1933 - The definition
was signed at London on July 3 , 1933, by Rumania , Estonia,
Latavia , Poland, Turkey, The Soviet Union, Persia, Afghanis tan
It was one of the most authoritative sources on International
Law.
Der Sicherheitsdienst (SD) - The Secret State Security Service.
Deutsche Arbeitsfront - The German Labor Front , a Nazi controlled
labor bureau, directed by Robert Ley to teach the Nazi philosophy
to German workers and to weed out from industrial employment all
who were from industrial employment all who were backward in
their lessons.
Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) - The Secret State Police.
Die Schutzstaffeln (SS) - The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.
Die Sturmabteilungen (SA) - The Nationalist Socialist Assault Troops,
known as the "brownshirts".

Eighth Assembly by the League of Nations in 1927 - A resolution by
the representatives of forty-eight member nations, including
Germany , declaring that a war of aggression constituted an
international crime.
Geneva Protocal of 1924 - The protocal was for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes and signed by the representatives of
forty- eight governments . It declared that a war of aggression
constit uted an internati onal crime.
Hague Convention - An agreement which forbade the attacking of a ship
without warning and the use of prisoners of war in armament
factori es or any labor connected with the fighting .
Nacht und Nebel - German for ' Night and Fog ' referring to the secret
removal of Jews and other political suspects during the night
leaving no word of their whereabouts.
Nurnberg Decrees - Ordered on September 5, 1935 , deprived t he Jews
of German citizenship , confining them to the status of
"subjects. "
Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928 - The twenty-one Amer ican
Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that a war
of aggression constitutes an international crime against the
human species.

